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DOES U.S. FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT LAW NOW COVER
CASTE DISCRIMINATION BASED ON
UNTOUCHABILITY?: IF ALL ELSE FAILS THERE IS THE
POSSIBLE APPLICATION OF BOSTOCK V. CLAYTON
COUNTY
KEVIN BROWN, LALIT KHANDARE, ANNAPURNA WAUGHRAY, KENNETH DAUSCHMIDT, & THEODORE M. SHAW ∞
ABSTRACT
This article discusses the issue of whether a victim of caste discrimination
based on untouchability can assert a claim of intentional employment
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discrimination under Title VII or Section 1981. This article contends that there
are legitimate arguments that this form of discrimination is a form of religious
discrimination under Title VII. The question of whether caste discrimination is a
form of race or national origin discrimination under Title VII or Section 1981
depends upon how the courts apply these definitions to caste discrimination based
on untouchability. There are legitimate arguments that this form of discrimination
is recognized within the concept of race discrimination or national origin
discrimination under Title VII or race discrimination under Section 1981.
However, if courts reject these conclusions, the approach adopted by the Supreme
Court in its June 2020 decision in Bostock v. Clayton County would provide
another potent legal argument for recognizing such discrimination.
The Bostock approach avoids the question of whether caste discrimination
based on untouchability is a form of national origin or racial discrimination. This
approach draws on the Supreme Court’s recognition that the “but-for” causation
standard applies under both Title VII and Section 1981. The but-for test directs us
to change one thing at a time and see if the outcome changes. If it does, we have
found a but-for cause. And multiple but-for causes can exist. Applying this
approach to intentional employment discrimination against gays, lesbians, or
transgender individuals, the Supreme Court pointed out that such a person’s sex
is inextricably intertwined with their other status. The Court concluded that
discrimination against a person because they are gay, lesbian, or transgender
means that you are discriminating against such a person based on that status,
which is not protected, and their sex, which is. Thus, under the Bostock approach,
because all of those who are victims of caste discrimination based on
untouchability are from Asia, their caste is inextricably intertwined with their
race. As a result, when Dalits are victims of intentional discrimination based on
untouchability, the discriminator is motivated to discriminate against them
because of their caste, which is not a protected trait, and their race, which is.
Thus, intentional caste discrimination inevitably also involves race discrimination
under both Title VII and Section 1981.

of the University of Florida School of Law on March 31, 2002. The authors would also like to thank
the panelist and participants for their helpful suggestions. Finally, the authors would like to thank
Javon Coatie and Ashley Scurlock for the valuable research assistance.
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INTRODUCTION
Untouchability stems from the over 3,000-year-old caste system of the Indian
subcontinent, a hierarchical system that stratifies individuals into groups based on
birth. 1 For simplification, the “caste system” consists of four distinct
hierarchically ranked ‘varnas’ or major occupational groupings (we will refer to
all of those in these groups, collectively, as “Caste Hindus”). Dalits constitute a
sort of fifth caste outside the four-fold system. Dalits were also known as
“outcastes” or “untouchables” to illustrate that they, religiously, fell outside the
four-fold Hindu caste system. 2 These five broad caste groups can be broken down
into thousands of hierarchically ranked subcastes or “jatis”—the indigenous
Indian word. 3 In traditional Hindu society, occupations were allocated among
different social groups according to Hindu law and custom that reflected the
“classic expression of inequality, viz., caste.” 4 Thus, to a certain extent,
employment discrimination based on caste is a way of life. Caste also ensured that
there was little concern in Indian society for the rights of individuals. The
functioning of the caste system excluded whole segments of society from positions
of respect and responsibility without consideration of individual talents, abilities,
or interests. 5 Every individual’s social position in Indian society was (and to a
large extent, particularly in rural India where three-fourths of Dalits reside, 6 still
is) defined by the jati into which he or she is born.
Historically, Dalits were forced into the occupations regarded as ritually
“impure”, such as leather workers, manual scavenging (manually clearing human
feces from public and private latrines using hand-held implements, without
mechanization or protective equipment), disposing of dead animal carcasses and

1. See infra notes 84–85. For a detailed discussion of the caste system, see LOUIS DUMONT,
HOMO HIERARCHICUS: THE CASTE SYSTEM AND ITS IMPLICATIONS (1972).
2. See infra note 84.
3. Varna is a Hindu concept whereas jati is a cross-religious cultural phenomenon. Thus, not
all jatis are subsumed into one of the four varnas.
4. M. N. SRINIVAS, CASTE IN MODERN INDIA 88 (1962).
5. See generally DUMONT, supra note 1.
6. India: Official Dalit Population Exceeds 200 Million, INT’L DALIT SOLIDARITY NETWORK
(May 29, 2013), https://idsn.org/india-official-dalit-population-exceeds-200-million/ [https://
perma.cc/NHR4-S97W].
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temple prostitution (devadasi). 7 Hindus believe that engaging in these activities is
religiously polluting to the individuals who perform them and that this spiritual
pollution is contagious. 8 Since this spiritual pollution stemmed from birth, even
today Dalits cannot escape it by deed, attainment of highly valued educational
credentials, or rise in social or economic standing. 9 Because of this religious
pollution, Caste Hindus took elaborate precautions to prevent even incidental
contact between themselves and Dalits.10 Like the concept of social distancing
that has developed in response to Covid-19 and its variants, when it came to
avoiding contact with Dalits, Caste Hindus engaged in extreme social distancing.
They commonly banned and segregated Dalits from full participation in Hindu
social life and required them to maintain a discrete distance. 11
Caste discrimination based on untouchability in the employment context has
generally been a hidden form of discrimination in the U.S., until recently. Even
though the caste system has existed for thousands of years, caste discrimination
based on untouchability was rarely recognized as an issue on American soil due
to the historically low numbers of South Asians in the U.S., of which only the
tiniest fraction were Dalits. As late as 1960, there were less than 13,000 people of
Indian origin in the country. 12 Over the past thirty years, however, the number of
South Asian immigrants in the U.S. has skyrocketed. According to the Census
Bureau, there were more than 5.4 million people of South Asian descent in the
U.S. in 2018. 13 But, a 2003 University of Pennsylvania study revealed that only
1.5% of Indian immigrants in the U.S. were Dalits or members of the lower

7. SMITA NARULA, BROKEN PEOPLE: CASTE VIOLENCE AGAINST INDIA’S “UNTOUCHABLES” 141
(1999).
8. N. K. BOSE, THE STRUCTURE OF HINDU SOCIETY 28 (1975).
9. As a Dalit surgeon emphatically put it:
It is India’s most shameful paradox—this country has made almost
unimaginable progress in nearly every sphere of human life, but the one thing
unchanged is the condition of its dalits and backward communities. I am a
microsurgeon specialising in hand and spinal reconstruction, and am [a Member
of the Legislative Assembly] from Bihar, but I still remain very much a dalit—
a dhobi (“washerman”), to be precise, open to routine humiliation from the upper
castes.
Smita Narula, Equal by Law, Unequal by Caste: The “Untouchable” Condition in Critical Race
Perspective, 26 WIS. INT’L L.J. 255, 266 (2008).
10. See DEVANESAN NESIAH, DISCRIMINATION WITH REASON? THE POLICY OF RESERVATIONS IN
THE UNITED STATES, INDIA AND MALAYSIA 38 (1997). Despite the doctrinal denunciations of caste
and their espousal of equality, Sikhs, Muslims, and Christians also engage in social distancing
practices with respect to Dalits. See infra note 128 and accompanying text.
11. See infra note 122.
12. SANJOY CHAKRAVORTY, DEVESH KAPUR, & NIRKVIKAR SINGH, THE OTHER ONE PERCENT:
INDIANS IN AMERICA 24 (2017).
13. American Community Survey, Asian Alone or in Any Combination by Selected Groups,
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2018), https://data.census.gov/cedsci/table?q=B02018&tid=ACSDT1Y2019
.B02018&hidePreview=true [https://perma.cc/8R84-ACL4]. There were 4,605,550 Asian Indians,
208,200 Bangladeshi, 24,143, Bhutanese, 197,880 Nepalese, 554,202 Pakistanis, and 55,812 Sri
Lankans. Id.
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castes. 14 Like all immigrants, South Asians brought their beliefs with them,
including those about the caste system.
As a result of more immigration from South Asia, more employment
discrimination claims based on caste can be expected. For example, Cisco
Systems, Inc. (“Cisco”), is engaged in an employment discrimination litigation
initially commenced in June 2020 by the California Department of Fair
Employment and Housing (“DFEH”). 15 In the case, DFEH alleges that Cisco
engaged in caste discrimination based on untouchability against John Doe, a Dalit,
in violation of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”).16
Equality Labs, a nonprofit advocacy organization for Dalits, 17 received
complaints of caste discrimination from almost 260 U.S. tech workers in a threeweek period in the fall of 2020. 18 In addition, in October 2020, the Washington
Post published a statement from a group of 30 Dalit female Indian engineers
employed by Google, Apple, Microsoft, Cisco, and other tech companies. 19 The
statement thanked John Doe for filing his complaint and discussed the caste bias
they have encountered both in educational institutions in India and in the U.S. tech
sector. 20 In May 2021, a labor trafficking case was filed in the U.S. District Court
of New Jersey on behalf of 200 Indian nationals recruited from India to work on
construction of the largest Hindu temple in the U.S. 21 They were placed in a state
of total dependence on their employers. 22 Their employers took their passports
away and imprisoned them in a compound. 23 They were subjected to casteist
14. Tinku Ray, The US Isn’t Safe from the Trauma of Caste Bias, WORLD (Mar. 8, 2019, 9:00
AM), https://www.pri.org/stories/2019-03-08/us-isn-t-safe-trauma-caste-bias [https://perma.cc
/8W5Y-B8LE].
15. Cal. Dep’t of Fair Emp. & Hous. v. Cisco Sys. Inc., No. 20CV372366 (Santa Clara Cnty.
Super. Ct. Oct. 16, 2020). The claim was originally filed on June 30, 2020 in the United States
District Court of the Northern District of California. DFEH brought suit against Cisco regarding its
discriminatory treatment of John Doe, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and
the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). DFEH, however, dismissed the filing in
the US District Court on October 16, 2020 and refiled in the Superior Court of California, Santa
Clara County, the same day, resting its claims solely on FEHA.
16. California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12900 (West
2022). The complaint filed by DFEH alleges that Cisco engaged in unlawful employment practices
based on religion, ancestry, national origin/ethnicity, and race/color against John Doe, a Dalit.
17. EQUALITY LABS, https://www.equalitylabs.org [https://perma.cc/7CHN-Z3XQ] (last
visited Feb. 3, 2021).
18. Nitasha Tiku, India’s Engineers Have Thrived in Silicon Valley. So Has Its Caste System.,
WASH. POST (Oct. 27, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/10/27/indian
-caste-bias-silicon-valley/ [https://perma.cc/2SVG-HZPL].
19. Dalit Women Technologists’ Statement About Caste in Silicon Valley, WASH. POST (Oct.
27, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/context/a-statement-on-caste-bias-in-silicon-valley
-from-30-dalit-women-engineers/d692b4f8-2710-41c3-9d5f-ea55c13bcc50/
[https://perma.cc
/VF6A-K42V].
20. Id.
21. Complaint, Kumar v. Bochasanwasi Shri Akshar Purushottam Swaminarayan Sanstha,
Inc., No. 3:21-CV-11048 (D. N.J. May 11, 2021).
22. Id. at § 104.
23. Id. at § 4.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3816265

5 BROWN (DO NOT DELETE)

9/7/2022 5:02 PM

2022] CASTE DISCRIMINATION IN U.S. FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT LAW

123

insults and humiliations. 24 Their status as Dalits was the reason why they were
recruited, exploited, and mistreated in this way. 25 In fact, the U.S. State
Department has consistently noted caste-based trafficking, sexual, and labor
exploitation from India disproportionately impacts Dalits. 26
If we propose the normative question in the context of American society,
should caste discrimination based on untouchability, if it is practiced, be a form of
employment discrimination, the answer must be a resounding yes! The
comparison between caste and other forms of discrimination was made in the U.S.
by abolitionists in the 1830s, who expressed their disgust at the caste system.27
Before the Civil War, abolitionists analogized the treatment of enslaved Black
people in the U.S. to the Indian caste system in order to argue against the horrors
of slavery in the south and for better treatment of formerly enslaved persons in the
north. 28
U.S. courts have rarely addressed the issue of whether anti-discrimination
employment measures ban caste discrimination.29 For purposes of discussing
caste discrimination in employment, the most appropriate federal laws are 42
U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Section 1981, which
originated with the Civil Rights Act of 1866, only applies to race discrimination.30
Title VII makes it “unlawful . . . for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to
discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual . . .
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 31
This article is limited to federal employment claims for intentional caste
discrimination based on untouchability under Section 1981 and Title VII. Because
Section 1981 provides a basis for claims of discrimination for police misconduct,
housing, zoning, and education, the article is also suggesting that federal law
provides other important legal remedies for Dalits beyond the employment

24. Id. at § 7 (People in the Scheduled Caste in India, for example, were formerly considered
“untouchables” and “endure near complete social ostracization.” At the temple in New Jersey,
temple leadership did what they could to remind these marginalized workers of their place in the
social hierarchy. Defendant Swami Prasanand, for example, called the workers “worms,” thus
exacerbating the psychological coercion the workers experienced.)
25. Id.
26. See, e.g., OFF. TO MONITOR AND COMBAT TRAFFICKING IN PERS., U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2021
TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT: INDIA, https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-trafficking-in
-persons-report/india/ [https://perma.cc/P2AC-UQ7K] (last visited Feb. 26, 2022).
27. See infra notes 172–73.
28. Id.
29. See, e.g., Mazumder v. Univ. of Mich., 195 F. App’x 320, 323 (6th Cir. 2005). The caste
discrimination issue was raised, but not fully litigated, and the Court expressed an unfamiliarity with
the concept through their use of quotation marks around the term.
30. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (“All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have
the same right in every State and Territory . . . to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings
. . . as is enjoyed by white citizens.”) (emphasis added).
31. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e–2(a)(1).
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context. 32 In this article, we will contend that there is a legitimate argument that
caste discrimination is a form of religious discrimination under Title VII.
However, the strongest arguments involve the assertions that caste discrimination
based on untouchability are included within race and/or national origin
discrimination.
The question of whether caste discrimination is a form of race or national
origin discrimination under Title VII or race discrimination under Section 1981
comes down to whether caste fits within the definition of those protected traits
under the respective statutory frameworks. Title VII does not include a definition
for “race,” and the Supreme Court has not yet elaborated on the term for purposes
of Title VII. Though Section 1981 doesn’t use the word “race,” within a decade
of the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the Supreme Court confirmed that
it “is intended for the protection of citizens of the United States in their enjoyment
of certain rights without discrimination on account of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude.” 33
In addressing what groups constitute a race under Section 1981, the Supreme
Court stated in Saint Francis College v. Al Khazraji that the definition of race was
to be drawn from how it was understood in the 19th century. 34 The number of
groups recognized as different races was far more expansive in the 19th century
than is commonly thought today. The prevailing conceptions of race in the U.S.
have been strongly influenced by the federal government’s definitions of different
races that first went into effect in 1977. 35 In Saint Francis College, the Court
reviewed several 19th-century sources defining race, specifically listing several
races from those sources; these included Finns, Romani, Basques, Hebrews,
Swedes, Norwegians, Germans, Greeks, Italians, Spanish, Mongolians, Russians,
and Jews. 36 As one can see, the concept of race also includes what today we might
think of as ethnic or national origin groups. What is also of particular importance
is that the Romani are one of the listed “racial” groups. 37 The Roma, however, are
believed to be Dalits who migrated from India into Persia, the near East and,
finally, into Eastern and Central Europe beginning around A.D. 600. 38 There are
other compelling reasons to assert that Americans of the 19th century viewed

32. While the largest percentage of actions filed under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981 are employment
discrimination claims, § 1981 causes of action include race discrimination for police misconduct,
housing, zoning, and schools. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart Schwab, The Importance of
Section 1981, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 596, 601 (1988).
33. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 555 (1875).
34. Saint Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 610 (1987).
35. See infra note 293 and accompanying text.
36. Saint Francis Coll., 481 U.S. at 611.
37. Id.
38. Palash Ghosh, Centuries of Discrimination: European Roma Linked to India’s
‘Untouchables’, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2012), https://www.ibtimes.com/centuries
-discrimination-european-roma-linked-indias-untouchables-917965
[https://perma.cc/2UR8
-QCG2].
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different Indian castes as separate races. 39 Further, while Section 1981 and Title
VII are from two different Civil Rights Acts, whose initial passages were almost
100 years apart, courts often analyze intentional employment discrimination
claims involving race and national origin under the two statutes in a very similar,
if not identical, way. “[T]he facts necessary to support a claim for relief under
Title VII are nearly identical to the facts which support a claim under Section
1981.” 40
There are, therefore, several arguments that caste discrimination fits within
the concept of race discrimination under Section 1981 and the protected traits of
religion, race, and national origin under Title VII. However, the greatest strength
of the argument that caste discrimination is covered by federal employment
discrimination law is the fact that if courts reject the argument that caste
discrimination fits within any of the protected categories of those two provisions,
the analysis used by the Supreme Court in Bostock v. Clayton County, 41 a major
Title VII case decided in 2020, would come into play.
The approach taken by the Supreme Court in Bostock would, if applied to a
claim of caste discrimination, avoid the difficult question of whether caste fits in
the definition of race or national origin. In Bostock, the Court addressed whether
discrimination against gay, lesbian, and transgendered individuals constitutes sex
discrimination under Title VII. In addressing the question, Justice Neil Gorsuch
explained that, in Title VII claims, “a but-for test directs us to change one thing at
a time and see if the outcome changes. If it does, we have found a but-for cause.”42
There can be multiple but-for causes. Gorsuch noted that although a person’s
sexual orientation and gender identity are separate and distinct from a person’s
sex, their sex is nevertheless inextricably linked to their other status. 43 Even if an
39. See remarks made in particular by Senator Charles Sumner. In his discussion during the
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, Sumner compares the Indian caste system with Brahmans
and Shudras to the U.S. race situation with blacks and whites. See infra notes 177–82 and
accompanying text; see also CHARLES SUMNER, EQUALITY BEFORE THE LAW PROTECTED BY
NATIONAL STATUTE: SPEECHES OF HON. CHAS. SUMNER 15 (1874), https://tile.loc.gov/storage
-services/service/rbc/lcrbmrp/t2415/t2415.pdf [https://perma.cc/MV2K-ZXK7] (“Religion and
reason condemn Caste as impious and unchristian, making republican institutions and equal laws
impossible; but here is Caste not unlike that which separates the Sudra from the Brahmin.”). This
analogy was meant to demonstrate that racism in the United States is similar to the caste system of
the South Asian continent. Thus, the framers of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 would have viewed
discrimination against Dalits as interracial discrimination as opposed to intra-racial discrimination.
40. Caldwell v. Martin Marietta Corp., 632 F.2d 1184, 1186 (5th Cir. 1980). See also Village
of Freeport v. Barrella, 814 F.3d 594, 607 (2d Cir. 2016) (“[W]e analyze claims of racial
discrimination identically under Title VII and § 1981 in other respects, and we see no reason why
we should not do the same with respect to how we define race with for purposes of those statutes.”).
41. Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
42. Id. at 1739. He also noted that Congress amended Title VII in 1991 to allow a plaintiff to
prevail merely by showing that a protected trait was a “motivating factor” in an adverse employment
action. Id. Thus, “under this more forgiving standard, liability can sometimes follow even if sex
wasn’t a but-for cause of the employer’s challenged decision.” Id. However, the motivating factor
test is not the issue in Bostock.
43. Id. at 1746–47.
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employer’s goal is only to discriminate against a person because they are gay,
lesbian, or a transgender individual, it is not possible without also discriminating
against the person because of their sex. To demonstrate this, Gorsuch noted that if
you changed the gay, lesbian, or transgender individual’s sex, say a gay man to a
woman, would that change lead to a different outcome by the employer? If the
answer is yes, then the discrimination is also based on sex. 44 Clearly the answer
is yes, because the change would eliminate the gay, lesbian, or transgender status
that was the motivation for the adverse employment treatment. Although an
individual’s status as gay, lesbian, or transgender is not a listed protected trait,
Bostock holds, it is equivalent to discrimination based on the protected trait of
sex. 45
The Bostock approach should apply to claims of caste discrimination based
on untouchability. Since all Dalits in the U.S. originated in South Asia, 46 caste is
inextricably linked to being a member of the Asian race. When a person
discriminates against a Dalit based on untouchability, they are discriminating
against that person based both on caste, which is not a protected category, and
race, which is. But it is important to note that this Bostock argument is only legally
necessary if courts first conclude that caste discrimination based on untouchability
is not a form of race or national origin discrimination under Title VII or race
discrimination under Section 1981.
Dalits have legal protection under the 1989 Scheduled Caste and Scheduled
Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act against discriminatory and abusive behavior
by high-caste communities. 47 In addition, the Protection of Civil Rights Act 1955
specifically prohibits discrimination and offences related to business, trade,
employment, healthcare, religion, and various other civil spheres. 48 However,
these provisions are under criminal law and do not provide civil remedies to meet
the holistic needs of caste-related employment discrimination in private
companies. Until the mid-1990s, caste discrimination was neither recognized in
international human rights law nor included in human rights discourse. 49 This
changed due to Dalit activists and their supporters throughout the world
advocating for global recognition of the discrimination they face not just in India,
but throughout the South Asian diaspora. 50 They have succeeded in getting caste

44. Id. at 1741.
45. Id.
46. See, e.g., GAIL OMVEDT, DALITS AND THE DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION 31 (1994) (“The caste
system exists in the South Asian subcontinent and there only.”).
47. The Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (Act. No.
33/1989) (India), https://tribal.nic.in/actRules/preventionofAtricities.pdf [https://perma.cc/LZ7Z
-D4BR] (last visited July 10, 2022).
48. See generally The Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955 (Act. 22/1955) (India),
https://www.indiacode.nic.in/handle/123456789/1544?locale=en [https://perma.cc/9WDF-NEYF].
49. Annapurna Waughray, Caste Discrimination: A Twenty-First Century Challenge for UK
Discrimination Law, 72 MODERN L. REV. 182, 191 (2009).
50. Id.
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discrimination declared a violation of international human rights law. 51 However,
because of the prodigious international weight of U.S. law, for the 200 million
Dalits in India alone and the Dalit diaspora, 52 a determination that U.S. federal
employment discrimination law banned caste discrimination based on
untouchability by private employers would have incalculable global ramifications.
This article is written in four parts. The first part discusses the immigration of
South Asians to the U.S., including their dramatic increase in numbers over the
past thirty years. It also provides an explanation of the caste system and the
discrimination that Dalits have endured and continue to experience. 53 The second
part will focus on employment discrimination claims for caste discrimination
based on untouchability under Section 1981. 54 The third part will discuss Title VII
claims of caste discrimination based on untouchability. 55 The fourth part will
provide the argument that is derived from Bostock v. Clayton County that caste
discrimination is intertwined with race discrimination. 56 It will discuss the
Bostock case, and how this approach applies under Title VII, as well as Comcast
Corporation v. National Association of African American Owned Media,57
another Supreme Court case in 2020 in which the Court applied the same approach
to a Section 1981 claim.
II.

CASTE SUBORDINATION OF DALITS IN SOUTH ASIA AND THE U.S.
Over the past thirty years, the number of South Asian immigrants in the U.S.
has skyrocketed. The first section of this part will discuss the history of
immigration to the U.S. from South Asia, including its recent dramatic rise. As the
number of South Asians in the U.S. increased, the number of incidents of caste
51. Specifically, caste discrimination is viewed as a violation of the International Convention
on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination as a sub-category of racial discrimination
based on descent, and separately as a category of discrimination based on work and descent, a
broader form of discrimination condemned by the U.N. Id. One of the Dalit activists’ and supporters’
most highly publicized efforts, however, occurred when they unsuccessfully lobbied to have caste
discrimination officially recognized as a form of racial discrimination at the 2001 U.N. World
Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and other related forms of
Intolerance held in Durban, South Africa. They were unsuccessful, but as a result caste acquired
global visibility as a ground of discrimination. Id. at 193.
52. Gautham Subramanyam, In India, Dalits Still Feel Bottom of the Caste Ladder, NBC
NEWS (Sept. 13, 2020), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/india-dalits-still-feel-bottom
-caste-ladder-n1239846 [https://perma.cc/3T3Y-M7FS]; see also Larry Simon & Sukhdeo
Thorat, Editorial, 2 CASTE: A GLOBAL JOURNAL ON SOCIAL EXCLUSION vi, viii (2021); India:
Official Dalit population exceeds 200 million, INT’L DALIT SOLIDARITY NETWORK (May 29,
2013), https://idsn.org/india-official-dalit-population-exceeds-200-million/ [https://perma.cc
/73DL-X2ZH].
53. See infra notes 58–142 and accompanying text.
54. See infra notes 143–253 and accompanying text.
55. See infra notes 254–350 and accompanying text.
56. See infra notes 351–94 and accompanying text.
57. Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Afr. Am.-Owned Media, 140 S. Ct. 1009 (2020).
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discrimination based on untouchability increased as well. The second section of
this part will discuss the 3,500-year-old five-fold caste system. The third section
will discuss the discrimination Dalits experience due to the concept of
untouchability that exists within South Asian and American societies today.
A. Brief History of South Asian Immigration to the U.S.
South Asians did not start to migrate in large numbers until the British Empire
outlawed slavery in the 1833 and created a new demand for replacement labor.58
Subjects of the British Empire, South Asians coming to the west coast of the
Americas in the latter half of the 19th century also tended to head to British
Columbia, especially Vancouver. 59 A few South Asians immigrated to the U.S. in
the 19th century. In 1870, there were only 586 reported India-born individuals in
the U.S. and 2031 in 1900. 60
Congress enacted several measures aimed at stemming immigration from
Asia, beginning with the Page Act in 1875. 61 For South Asians, this culminated
in 1917. Congress adopted legislation that banned anyone born within a
geographical area that included most of Asia and all of South Asia. 62 The area was
known as the Asiatic Barred Zone. 63
According to the 1920 census, fewer than 5,000 Indians resided in the U.S. at
the time. 64 Some lived in the Northeast and Midwest and became parts of
working-class neighborhoods from New York to Baltimore to Detroit, but most
resided in California. 65 With restrictions on immigration in place, the numbers of
South Asians declined. As late as 1940, there were only 2,405 South Asians in the
US. 66 The U.S. gradually lifted restrictions on immigration from South Asia after
World War II. 67 According to the Census Bureau figures in 1960, fewer than
13,000 people of Indian origin lived in the U.S. 68 In 1965, Congress enacted the
58. CHAKRAVORTY, KAPUR, & SINGH, supra note 12, at 5.
59. Maia Ramnath, Two Resolutions: The Ghadar Movement and India’s Radical Diaspora,
1913–1918, 92 RADICAL HIST. REV. 7, 10–11 (2005).
60. CHAKRAVORTY, KAPUR, & SINGH, supra note 12, at 6.
61. Page Act, Pub. L. No. 41-141, 18 Stat. 477 (1875); Geary Act, Pub. L. 52-60, 27 Stat. 25
(1892) (repealed 1943); Chinese Exclusion Act, Pub. L. No. 47-126, 22 Stat. 58 (1882) (repealed
1943).
62. Immigration Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 64-301, 39 Stat. 874, 875. The 1917 Act also
included a requirement that barred aliens over the age of 16 who could not read English or some
other dialect or language and who were incapable of reading.
63. See CHAKRAVORTY, KAPUR, & SINGH, supra note 12, at 11.
64. CHAKRAVORTY, KAPUR, & SINGH, supra note 12, at 6.
65. Ramnath, supra note 59, at 11. (“Even through the 1920s there were never more than a few
thousand Indians in the United States, the vast majority of whom lived on the West Coast, over threefourths of them in California.”). See also VIVEK BALD, BENGALI HARLEM AND THE LOST HISTORIES
OF SOUTH ASIAN AMERICA 7 (2013) (describing the roots South Asian immigrants put down in New
York, Baltimore, and Detroit, noting that the “greatest number appear to have settled in Harlem”).
66. CHAKRAVORTY, KAPUR, & SINGH, supra note 12, at 14.
67. Id. at 22–23.
68. Id. at 24.
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Family Reunification and Refugee Law, also known as the Hart-Cellar Act,69
which fundamentally changed U.S. immigration law. The Act and subsequent
immigration reforms reshaped American immigration policies. Among the
changes were provisions that led to significant increases in immigration from
South Asia. 70 According to a report by the Migration Policy Institute, in 2019
there were almost 2.7 million Indian immigrants in the country, up from 450,000
in 1990. 71 South Asian Americans Leading Together, a national movement
strategy and advocacy organization, estimates that in 2017 there were nearly 4.1
million people of Indian ancestry residing in the U.S., up 40% since 2010. 72 Many
Indian students also seek American higher education. During the academic year
that began in 2015, nearly 166,000 Indian immigrants were enrolled in U.S. higher
education institutions, making up about one-sixth of the international students in
the country. 73 About 20% of Indian immigrants live in California; Texas and New
Jersey are home to about 10% each, with the next three most populous states being
New York, Illinois, and Georgia, collectively accounting for another 17%. 74 The
Indian population in the U.S. is both well-educated and prosperous. In 2019,
almost 80% of Indian immigrants ages 25 and older had at least a bachelor’s
degree, in contrast to about 33% of the adult U.S. population overall. 75 In addition,
Indian households’ 2019 median income of $132,000 was double that of U.S. born
households. 76
Commentators have generally credited the Y2K problem, also known as the
“millennium bug,” as the catalyst for the upsurge in immigration from India.77
When the Y2K problem became apparent, India had a sizable and appropriate
labor force to address the issue. While attacking the Y2K problem, tech companies
in the West, including in the U.S., recognized that Indian firms offered not just
cheap labor, but highly skilled services at a low cost. 78 As a result, multi-national
information technology companies became aware of this vast pool of skilled

69. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, 8 U.S.C. § 1151.
70. See, e.g., id.; Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102; Immigration Act of
1990, Pub. L. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978.
71. Mary Hanna & Jean Batalova, Indian Immigrants in the United States, MIGRATION POL’Y
INST. (Oct. 16, 2020), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/indian-immigrants-united-states
-2019 [https://perma.cc/J727-QDHA].
72. Demographic Snapshot of South Asians in the United States, S. ASIAN AMS. LEADING
TOGETHER (Apr. 2019), https://saalt.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/SAALT-Demographic
-Snapshot-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/2B6Y-9QY8].
73. Jie Zong & Jeanne Batalova, Indian Immigrants in the United States in 2015, MIGRATION
POL’Y INST. (Aug. 31, 2017), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/indian-immigrants-united
-states-2015 [https://perma.cc/S2QL-QWPA].
74. Hanna & Batalova, supra note 71.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. CHAKRAVORTY, KAPUR, & SINGH, supra note 12, at 53.
78. ANNALEE SAXENIAN, THE NEW ARGONAUTS: REGIONAL ADVANTAGE IN A GLOBAL
ECONOMY 276 (2006).
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workers. This created a huge demand for their services.79 Around 1995, the Indian
Y2K cohort started entering the US in large numbers to help fill the growing
demands for information technology workers. 80
Even though there have been South Asians in the U.S. for over 170 years,
very few of them have been Dalits.81 Thus, while Dalits make up about 16.5% of
the population in India, 82 in 2003, a University of Pennsylvania study noted that
only 1.5% of Indian immigrants in the United States were Dalits or members of
lower castes. 83 Due to discrimination in South Asia, few Dalits have had the
money or requisite skills to participate in immigration to North America in either
the past or recent immigration waves.
B. The Five-Fold Caste System
There is some debate, but scholars typically agree that the caste system is
thousands of years old. 84 For example, Prakash Louis asserts that the caste system
is at least 3,000 years old. 85 The Buddha, who lived about 2,500 years ago,
preached against it. 86 For simplification, the caste system can be broken down into
four distinct ‘varnas,’ or major occupational groupings, plus the Dalits as a sort of
fifth caste. 87 The Bhagavad Gita, which is one of the most revered Hindu texts,
mentions the four-fold division. 88 More importantly, one of the most sacred Hindu
creation myths contained in the Rigveda sanctions the caste system.89 According
79. CHAKRAVORTY, KAPUR, & SINGH, supra note 12, at 52–56.
80. Id. at 30. A tangible result of this increased demand was a substantial increase in annual
remittance flows into India from just around 6 billion dollars in 1995 to over 70 billion by 2012. See
id. at 54; see also Hanna & Batalova, supra note 71.
81. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
82. DR. C. CHANDRAMOULI, OFF. OF THE REGISTRAR GEN. & CENSUS COMM’R, INDIA, MINISTRY
OF HOME AFFS., Census of India 2011: Release of Primary Census Abstract Data Highlights (2013),
https://idsn.org/wp-content/uploads/user_folder/pdf/New_files/India/2013/INDIA_CENSUS
_ABSTRACT-2011-Data_on_SC-STs.pdf [https://perma.cc/8MSZ-5DGD].
83. Ray, supra note 14.
84. OLIVER MENDELSOHN & MARIKA VICZIANY, THE UNTOUCHABLES 5–7 (1998). There has
also been criticism that the four-fold caste system was created by British colonial thinkers and was
never recognized in South Asia in the way the four-fold division suggests. See SANJOY
CHAKRAVORTY, THE TRUTH ABOUT US: THE POLITICS OF INFORMATION FROM MANU TO MODI (2019).
See also, Sanjoy Chakravorty, Viewpoint: How the British Reshaped India’s Caste System, BBC
NEWS (June 19, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-48619734 [https://
perma.cc/U9UC-ZGAF].
85. PRAKASH LOUIS, CASTEISM IS HORRENDOUS THAN RACISM: DURBAN AND DALIT DISCOURSE
21–22 (2001).
86. See, e.g., OMVEDT, supra note 46; see also DR. B. R. AMBEDKAR, THE BUDDHA & HIS
DHAMMA 172 (2010); OMVEDT, BUDDHISM IN INDIA: CHALLENGING BRAHMANISM AND CASTE
(2003).
87. B. R. AMBEDKAR, THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS OF B. R. AMBEDKAR (Valerian Rodrigues ed.,
2002). For an explanation of the Shudra caste and its relationship to the Dalit caste, see infra notes
108–13 and accompanying text.
88. Id. at 198.
89. B. R. Ambedkar, Riddles in Hinduism, in 4 BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR WRITING & SPEECHES
190 (1974).
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to this revered text, all existence derived from the division of an original primal
man known as Purusha. 90 Three-quarters of Purusha transcended the world we
perceive and one-quarter came to Earth. 91 From the part that came to Earth, his
head became the Brahmins, the priestly caste.92 His arms became the Kshatriyas,
the princely and warrior caste. 93 The stomach or the thighs of Purusha became the
Vaishyas, the business and merchant caste. 94 Because of their dominance in the
caste system, these three groups are collectively referred to as “high-caste” or
“forward-caste” Hindus. 95 Members of these three upper castes undergo special
initiation religious ceremonies that make them “twice born.” 96
The caste system embodies the message that the advantage accorded to highcaste Hindus is the result of divine privilege attributable to the good karma these
individuals accumulated over many prior lives. In other words, the spiritual
advantage of high-caste Hindus in this current life is a form of self-executing
justice accumulated through their various prior rounds of existence.
Though the caste system reaches far back in history, various studies
conducted in the past decade have illuminated the effects the caste system
continues to have today. High-caste Hindus still dominate India’s political,
judicial, economic, financial, educational, and religious institutions. Even though
an Economist article estimated that only 3.6% of India’s 1.4 billion population are
Brahmins, 97 experts estimate that they hold more than 70% of government
posts. 98 In addition, Brahmins hold 78% of the judicial positions and
approximately half of parliamentary seats in India. 99 A 2010 study found that
about 93% of board members of India’s top 1000 businesses were members of the
upper castes. 100 A 2019 U.S. study of 4,005 leading Indian firms revealed that
only three out of 35,000 directorships belonged to Dalits and other marginalized

90. See also 1 J. MUIR, ORIGINAL SANSKRIT ON THE ORIGIN AND HISTORY OF THE PEOPLE OF
INDIA TEXTS 7–11 (1868), https://www.forgottenbooks.com/en/readbook/OriginalSanskritTexts
_10020220 [https://perma.cc/L9PQ-WZWL].
91. Id. at 10.
92. See NESIAH, supra note 10, at 37.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Why Brahmins Lead Western Firms but Rarely Indian Ones, ECONOMIST (Jan. 1, 2022),
https://www.economist.com/asia/2022/01/01/why-brahmins-lead-western-firms-but-rarely-indian
-ones [https://perma.cc/Y7WP-C8CP]. There are 50 million Brahmins. Id.
98. See Henry Chu, A Gift for India’s Inter-Caste Couples, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2007), at A6.
99. Kevin D. Brown & Vinay Sitapati, Lessons Learned from Comparing the Application of
Constitutional Law and Federal Anti-Discrimination Law to African-Americans in the U.S. and
Dalits in India in the Context of Higher Education, 24 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 3, 16 n.78 (2008).
100. D Ajit, Han Donker, & Ravi Saxena, Corporate Boards in India: Blocked by Caste?,
ECON. & POL. WKLY., Aug. 11, 2012, at 39, 41. Of the board members of the top 1000 businesses,
46% were Vaishyas and 44% were Brahmins. Id.
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groups. 101 In a study conducted by the Savitribai Phule Pune University,
Jawaharlal Nehru University, and Indian Institute of Dalit Studies from 2015 to
2017, high-caste Hindus “boast[ed] four times more wealth than those classified
as Scheduled Castes.” 102 The study also noted that high-caste Hindus held roughly
41% of the total wealth in the country, almost double their population size.103
Another study found that a large percentage of mergers and acquisitions in India
“occur between businesses where the directors belong to the same caste group.”104
The study looked at 1200 merger and acquisition deals in India that took place
between the years 2000 and 2017. 105 When Brahmins had a maximum
representation on the Board of the acquiring company, nearly half of the targeted
firms had majority Brahmin boards. 106 For Vaishyas, the percentage was even
higher. Where the acquiring firm had a Board controlled by Vaishyas, the targeted
firm had a board dominated by Vaishyas 55% of the time. 107
In contrast to the auspicious spiritual origins of the high-caste Hindus,
Purusha’s feet became the peasants and farmers. 108 This group, known as the
Shudras, are commonly referred to as low-caste Hindus. 109 The legal term used
for them is “Other Backwards Classes” (OBCs). 110 The religiously imposed duty
of Shudras is to serve the high castes. They are also the largest population caste,

101. Ammu Kannampilly, Caste Discrimination Taints Corporate India, YAHOO MONEY (Nov.
5, 2020), https://money.yahoo.com/caste-discrimination-taints-corporate-india-035606381.html
?soc_src=social-sh&soc_trk=ma [https://perma.cc/8JV9-HVR5].
102. Upper Caste Hindus Own 41 Per Cent of India’s Total Wealth: Study, BUSINESSTODAY.IN
(Feb. 14, 2019), https://www.businesstoday.in/current/economy-politics/upper-caste-hindus-own
-41-per-cent-india-total-wealth-study/story/318727.html [https://perma.cc/4U6Q-6JD3].
103. Id. High-caste Hindus, or HHCs, make up about 22.28% of the total population in India.
The next big chunk of the country’s wealth is held by Hindu Other Backward Classes at 31%,
Muslims own 8% of the country’s wealth, and the two lowest castes own 11.3% combined of the
total wealth, even though their population size is over 27% of the country. Id.
104. Manaswini Bhalla & Manisha Goel, The Caste Is Alive and Kicking in Corporate India,
FORBES INDIA (Apr. 18, 2019), https://www.forbesindia.com/article/iim-bangalore/the-caste-is
-alive-and-kicking-in-corpo-rate-india/53059/1 [https://perma.cc/5A2T-Q2YN]. The results of the
study were published in a paper entitled Firms of a Feather Merge Together: Cultural Proximity
and Firms Outcome. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. The study found the same for Kshatriya- and Shudra-dominated firms. Id.
108. B. R. AMBEDKAR, Who Were the Shudras?, in 7 BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR WRITING &
SPEECHES 21, 22–24 (1979).
109. MANORANJAN MOHANTY, CLASS, CASTE, GENDER 20 (2004).
110. Id. at 209.
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making up around 52% of India’s population according to the Mandal
Commission 111 and around 41% by National Sample Survey 2004-5. 112
Beneath the four main castes are the Dalits. The origins of untouchability are
lost in the long-ago past. Dalits are not mentioned in the Purusha Sukta, noted
above. 113 The Laws of Manu is an ancient Hindu text that describes the caste
duties and obligations a person has towards himself and to others, including moral
and legal codes that govern caste order, but it does not mention Dalits either. 114
The legendary Dalit leader, Dr. B. R. Ambedkar, argues that untouchability was
the consequence of a struggle between Buddhists and the Brahmins, which the
latter won. 115 He places the origin of untouchability at around A.D. 400. 116
These five broad castes can be broken down into thousands of subcastes or
“jatis.” 117 Every individual’s social position in Indian society was, and, to a large
extent—particularly in rural India—still is, defined by the jati into which he or she
is born. Caste rankings and rules vary depending on the context and the region of
India. 118 The hierarchy of the caste system places each of the thousands of
subcastes into its appropriate relative position. As Ambedkar puts it, “Hindu
society was just like a tower which had several storeys [sic] without a ladder or an
entrance. One was to die in the storey [sic] in which one was born.” 119 And, as
pointed out by Clark Cunningham and Dr. Madhava Menon:
The historic caste system in India was truly systemic: everyone
had a place within it. As a result, the caste system not only
drastically exploited and disadvantaged certain groups, such as
the erstwhile untouchables; it also concentrated advantage in
111. See Aparna Alluri & Zoya Mateen, Caste Census: Clamour to Count India Social Groups
Grows, BBC NEWS (Aug. 24, 2021), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-58141993
[https://perma.cc/E7P3-UAQC]. This is an estimate, independent India’s decanal census only counts
the castes of Dalits and Adivasis. Id. For caste percentage population estimates, see also Roshan
Kishore, Decoding the Purpose and Politics of Caste Census, HINDUSTAN TIMES (Aug. 24, 2021,
5:47 AM), https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/decoding-the-purpose-and-politics-of
-caste-census-101629741365130.html [https://perma.cc/9WRR-D8TY]. For percentages of school
children by caste, see Rema Nagarajan, School Enrolment Data Indicates 45% OBCs, 19% Dalits in
India, TIMES INDIA (July 30, 2021, 12:03 PM), https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/school
-enrolment-data-indicates-45-obcs-19-dalits-in-india/articleshow/84877162.cms [https://perma.cc
/RF3U-Z3K6].
112. Sonalde Desai, Caste and Census: A Forward-Looking Strategy, ECON. & POL. WKLY.,
July 17, 2010, at 10.
113. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
114. B. R. AMBEDKAR, Why Lawlessness Is Lawful, in 5 BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR WRITING &
SPEECHES 62, 64 (1989).
115. B. R. AMBEDKAR, Who Were They and Why They Became Untouchables, in 7 BABASAHEB
AMBEDKAR WRITING & SPEECHES 379 (1979).
116. Id.
117. See NESIAH, supra note 10, at 36–37.
118. Id. at 38.
119. S. D. Kapoor, B. R. Ambedkar, W. E. B. DuBois and the Process of Liberation, ECON. &
POL. WKLY., Dec. 27, 2003, at 5344, 5346 (quoting DHANANJAYA KEER, DR. B. R. AMBEDKAR: LIFE
AND MISSION 41 (3d ed. 1994)).
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other groups, such as the Brahmins. Both suffering and success
were largely attributable to where one was born into the social
hierarchy rather than individual effort and virtue. 120
Caste ensured its continued viability through the practice of endogamy and
social separation. In any hierarchical society, the social order is structured in terms
of privileges and disabilities of groups rather than the rights of individuals. The
common history and experience of being a member of a jati experiencing
oppression by the subcastes higher in the hierarchy and oppressing the subcastes
lower in the hierarchy generated a strong sense of group identity. Caste also
ensured that there was little concern in Indian society for the rights of individuals.
Thus, the functioning of the caste system excluded whole segments of society
from positions of respect and responsibility, without consideration of individual
talents, abilities, or interests. 121
C. Discrimination Dalits Experience Under the Caste System
While low-caste Hindus suffered due to their position in the caste system,
they did not suffer from oppression resulting from religious impurity, as Dalits
did. Thus, Dalits experienced far worse forms of subordination than low-caste
members. Caste Hindus maintained enough distance between themselves and
Dalits to prevent the shadows of Dalits (six feet) from touching them.122
Historically, Dalits were banned from Hindu temples, formal education, public
wells (often ones the Dalits themselves had dug), walking on roads in broad
daylight, and wearing clean clothes. 123 Caste Hindus not only refused to allow
Dalits in their homes, but their communities too; Dalit housing was segregated,
and they were relegated to the outskirts of towns. 124 Historically, the status of the
Dalits was associated with occupations regarded as ritually impure. Dalits took
care of trash and body disposal, maintained the sewage system, cleaned toilets,
worked with dead animals, collected cow manure and turned it into cooking fuel,

120. Clark D. Cunningham & N.R. Madhava Menon, Race, Class, Caste? Rethinking
Affirmative Action, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1296, 1302 (1999).
121. SUKHADEO THORAT & KATHERINE NEUMAN, BLOCKED BY CASTE: ECONOMIC
DISCRIMINATION IN MODERN INDIA 5 (2012).
122. B. R. AMBEDKAR, From Millions to Fractions, in 5 AMBEDKAR WRITING & SPEECHES 242
(1979).
123. Brown & Sitapati, supra note 99, at 4; see also B. R. AMBEDKAR, Untouchables or The
Children of India’s Ghetto, in 5 AMBEDKAR WRITING & SPEECHES 22, 59, 108 (1979); AMBEDKAR,
supra note 122, at 242.
124. Brown & Sitapati, supra note 99, at 4. See generally Sukhadeo Thorat, Anuradha
Banerjee, Vinod K Mishra, & Firdaus Rizvi, Urban Rental Housing Market: Caste and Religion
Matters in Access, ECON. & POL. WKLY, June 27, 2015, at 47 (providing an empirical study of antiDalit bias in private home sales and rentals).
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labored in the fields, worked on leather, and dug the wells for water. 125 Hindu
religious caste practices also excluded Dalits from engaging in business activities,
owning property and housing, attending educational institutions, and accessing
healthcare. 126 If Dalits violated caste laws, they were subjected to violent
punishments. 127
While untouchability is a product of the Hindu religion, it is not strictly a
problem for just Hindus. As Human Rights Watch notes, untouchability “is a
characteristic determined by one’s birth into a particular caste, irrespective of the
faith practiced by the individual.” 128 On the Indian sub-continent, distinctions and
discrimination on the basis of caste have penetrated other religions, including
Buddhism, Christianity, Islam and Sikhism, despite the fact that the doctrinal
bases for these religions reject caste. 129 Thus, while Hindu religion may be the
original source of Dalit oppression, conversion to other religions is not a
solution. 130
Perhaps the best example of demonstrating that changing religions does not
eliminate discrimination based on untouchability is the mass conversion of Dalits
to Buddhism led by Dr. Ambedkar. No one has done more to liberate Dalits and
the Dalit mind from the oppressive mentality presented to it by the Hindu religion
than Dr. Ambedkar. It may be impossible to convey to the average American how
significant of a figure Dr. Ambedkar is in the Dalit struggle. As Dalit activist
Anand Teltumbde put it, for the Dalit masses, Dr. Ambedkar is everything
125. See generally B. R. AMBEDKAR, PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIAL EXCLUSION AND INCLUSIVE
POLICIES (Sukhadeo Thorat & Narendra Kumar eds., 2008) (describing the historic treatment of
Dalits); GHANSHYAM SHAH, HARSH MANDER, SUKHADEO THORAT, SATISH DESHPANDE, & AMITA
BAVISKAR, UNTOUCHABILITY IN RURAL INDIA (2006); GOV’T OF INDIA, 1 REPORT OF THE INDIA
BACKWARD CLASSES COMMISSION (1955).
126. Sukhadeo Thorat & Katherine Neuman, Introduction to BLOCKED BY CASTE: ECONOMIC
DISCRIMINATION IN MODERN INDIA (2012).
127. A. Ramaiah, Growing Crimes Against Dalits in India Despite Special Laws: Relevance of
Ambedkar’s Demand for ‘Separate Settlement,’ 3 J. L. & CONFLICT RESOL. 151, 164 (2011),
https://academicjournals.org/journal/JLCR/article-full-text-pdf/2F95A1F7733
[https://perma.cc
/QKY2-VQG3].
128. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HIDDEN APARTHEID: CASTE DISCRIMINATION AGAINST INDIA’S
“UNTOUCHABLES” 2 (2007), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/india0207webwcover_0
.pdf [https://perma.cc/6KBF-QCJE].
129. See J. Tharamangalam, Caste Among Christians in India, in CASTE: ITS TWENTIETH
CENTURY AVATAR, 263 (M. N. Srinivas ed., 1996) (Christianity); DAVID G. MANDELBAUM, 2
SOCIETY IN INDIA: CHANGE & CONTINUITY 569, 571 (1970) (same); Roger Ballard, Differentiation
and Disjunction Among the Sikhs, in DESK PARDESH: THE SOUTH ASIAN PRESENCE IN BRITAIN 88, 91
(Roger Ballard ed., 1994) (discussing the role of caste distinctions among some Sikhs); Marcus
Banks, Jain Ways of Being, in PARDESH, supra, at 231, 250 (Jainism); John R. Hinnells, Parsi
Zoroastrians in London, in PARDESH, supra, at 250–51, 271 (Parsis (Indian Zoroastrians) as a castelike group). See generally CASTE AND SOCIAL STRATIFICATION AMONG MUSLIMS IN INDIA (Imtiaz
Ahmad ed., 1978) (collecting studies about social stratification in some Islamic communities and
how it is influenced by the Hindu concept of caste); Zarina Bhatty, Social Stratification Among
Muslims in India, in CASTE: ITS TWENTIETH CENTURY AVATAR, supra (Islam).
130. D. Shyam Babu & Chandra Bhan Prasad, Six Dalit Paradoxes, ECON. & POL. WKLY., June
6, 2009, at 22, 23.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3816265

5 BROWN (DO NOT DELETE)

136

N.Y.U. REVIEW OF LAW & SOCIAL CHANGE

9/7/2022 5:02 PM

[Vol. 46:117

together: a first-rate scholar, a Moses who led his people out of bondage, a
Bodhisattva in the Buddhist pantheon—he is like a god. 131 One important Dalit
slogan epitomizes Ambedkar’s significance: “We Are, Because He Was.” 132 In
1935, Dr. Ambedkar famously declared, “Even though I was born in the Hindu
religion, I will not die in the Hindu religion.” 133 On October 14, 1956, 134 near the
end of his life, Dr. Ambedkar led a mass conversion of over 500,000 Dalits to
Buddhism. 135 Following this lead, millions of Dalits have converted to
Buddhism. 136 While Buddhists make up only a small proportion of the overall
population of India, only about 8.4 million in a population of 1.2 billion, 87% of
them are Ambedkarites or new converts. 137 However, Caste Hindus continue to
treat Dalits who convert to Buddhism the same way. Thus, this religious
conversion did not allow them to escape caste discrimination, even if it allowed
them to shift their personal mindset.

131. ANAND TELTUMBDE, ‘AMBEDKAR’ IN AND FOR THE POST-AMBEDKAR DALIT MOVEMENT
(1997). Teltumbde is the grandson-in-law of Dr. Ambedkar. See Parth MN, India Arrests Activist
Anand Teltumbde over 2018 Caste Violence, AL JAZEERA (Apr. 14, 2020),
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/04/india-arrests-activist-anand-teltumbde-2018-dalit-event
-200414112452191.html [https://perma.cc/7EVW-T3GA].
132. See Sanghapali Aruna Lohitakshi, New Series: Dalit History Month—We Are Because He
Was, CRUNK FEMINIST COLLECTIVE, https://www.crunkfeministcollective.com/2015/04/21/new
-series-dalit-history-month-we-are-because-he-was/ [https://perma.cc/JMX5-H83D]. One can
purchase such a bumper sticker today from Amazon. See PEACOCKRIDE Vinyl Dr. Ambedkar We
Are Because He was Car Bumper Decal (Blue), AMAZON, https://www.amazon.in/Ambedkar
-because-Bumper-Decal-Blue/dp/B06XBVJ2PK [https://perma.cc/2N4R-PT8X] (last visited Oct. 4,
2021).
133. Tarun Vijay, An Ambedkar Speech No Hindu Should Ever Forget, TIMES INDIA (Apr. 16,
2019), https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/indus-calling/an-ambedkar-speech-every-hindu
-must-not-forget/ [https://perma.cc/DL5B-3FW2].
134. As a strange coincidence or a matter of fate, if you adjust for the time difference between
the U.S. and India, one of the authors of this article Kevin Brown was born on the very day that Dr.
Ambedkar led this mass conversion and another author, Ken Dau-Schmidt, was born the day before.
135. AMBEDKAR, supra note 86, at 5; ELEANOR ZELLIOT, FROM UNTOUCHABLE TO DALIT:
ESSAYS ON THE AMBEDKAR MOVEMENT 207–08 (3d ed. 2001) (“The following day he converted the
half million of his followers who had responded to his call to convert.”). See also OMVEDT, supra
note 86, at 2–3.
136. Krithika Varagur, Converting to Buddhism as a Form of Political Protest: Low-Caste
Indians are Leaving Hinduism En Masse—Partly to Stick It to Their Prime Minister, ATLANTIC (Apr.
11, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/04/dalit-buddhism-conversion
-india-modi/557570/ [https://perma.cc/54KV-JGH4].
137. Id. See also Manu Moudgil, Dalits Are Still Converting to Buddhism, but at a Dwindling
Rate, Bᴜs. Sᴛᴀɴᴅᴀʀᴅ (June 17, 2017), https://www.business-standard.com/article/current
-affairs/dalits-are-still-converting-to-buddhism-but-at-a-dwindling-rate-117061700355_1.html#:~
:text=After%201956%2C%20the%20number%20of,major%20Dalit%2Dcentric%20political
%20party [https://perma.cc/B3NW-TU4S].
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In 2018, Equality Labs conducted a first-of-its-kind survey of 1500
individuals from South Asia living in the U.S., 24% of whom were Dalits. 138 The
study revealed the existence of significant caste discrimination in the U.S. 139 The
survey exposed that while no Vaishyas, one percent of Brahmins, five percent of
Kshatriyas, and 25% of Shudras worry about others finding out their castes, over
half of the Dalits have this fear. 140 In addition, 41% of Dalit students surveyed
reported facing discrimination in educational institutions. 141 The most striking
result was that while high-caste Hindus experienced almost no discrimination in
employment, over two-thirds of Dalits said they experienced unfair treatment in
the workplace. 142
III.

CASTE DISCRIMINATION CAN GENERATE RACE DISCRIMINATION EMPLOYMENT
CLAIMS UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1981
Title VII applies to five different protected traits. 143 In contrast, Section 1981,
which originated with the Civil Rights Act of 1866, only forbids intentional
“racial” discrimination in the making, enforcing, and carrying out of both private
and public contracts. 144 However, courts analyze intentional employment
discrimination claims under Section 1981 and race and national origin claims
under Title VII in much the same way. 145 Thus, aggrieved individuals pursuing
disparate treatment employment claims for race or national origin discrimination
may 146 invoke both Section 1981 and Title VII.
138. Maari Zwick-Maitreyi, Thenmozhi Soundararajan, Natasha Dar, Ralph F. Bheel, &
Prathap Balakrishnan, CASTE IN THE UNITED STATES: A SURVEY OF CASTE AMONG SOUTH ASIAN
AMERICANS 16 (2018), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/58347d04bebafbb1e66df84c/t/
603ae9f4cfad7f515281e9bf/1614473732034/Caste_report_2018.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RT47
-AWFF].
139. Id. (“The results of our 2016 survey definitively find that all of the inequalities associated
with Caste status, ritual purity, and social exclusion have become embedded within . . . American
mainstream institutions.”).
140. Id. at 17 fig.8.
141. Id. at 18.
142. Id. at 20 fig.10. For Shudras, 12% of Shudra respondents experienced discrimination in
employment. Id.
143. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1).
144. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 168 (1976). Although Section 1981 does not itself use
the word “race,” the Court has construed the section to forbid all “racial” discrimination in the
making of private as well as public contracts.
145. See Caldwell v. Martin Marietta Corp., 632 F.2d 1184, 1186 (5th Cir. 1980) (“[T]he facts
necessary to support a claim for relief under Title VII are nearly identical to the facts which support
a claim under § 1981 . . . .”); see also Village of Freeport v. Barrella, 814 F.3d 594, 607 (2d Cir.
2016) (“[W]e analyze claims of racial discrimination identically under Title VII and § 1981 in [some]
. . . respects.”).
146. Eric Bachman, 5 Differences Between Title VII and Section 1981 That Can Help Your
Employment Race Discrimination Case, Nᴀᴛ’ʟ L. Rᴇᴠ. (June 12, 2017), https://www.natlawreview
.com/article/5-differences-between-title-vii-and-section-1981-can-help-your-employment-race
[https://perma.cc/MR9W-5X8R].
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The first section of this part will discuss the broad application of Section 1981
to race discrimination claims. The second section addresses the question of
whether caste discrimination based on untouchability is a form of race
discrimination under Section 1981. Neither Section 1981 nor Title VII define race.
However, for purposes of Section 1981, the Supreme Court has stated that the
definition of race comes from how it was understood in the 19th. 147 Thus, this
section will focus on how Americans of the 19th century understood caste
discrimination to show that there are several arguments that they viewed it as a
form of race discrimination.
A. Application of Section 1981 to Employment Discrimination
Though Section 1981 does not use the word “race,” within a decade of the
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the Supreme Court interpreted it to be
“intended for the protection of citizens of the United States in the enjoyment of
certain rights, without discrimination on account of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude.” 148 The Court’s interpretation of the Act includes the
prohibition of all “racial” discrimination in the making of both public and private
contracts. 149 The Court has thus limited applications of Section 1981 to cases of
racial discrimination. Title VII claims differ from Section 1981 claims in this way,
as well as several others. Section 1981 claims can be brought against any
employer, whereas Title VII claims must be brought against those who have at
least 15 employees. 150 Title VII claims are limited to employers, but an aggrieved
party raising a Section 1981 claim can also sue individuals, such as harassing
supervisors. Whereas Title VII has damage caps that depend on the size of the
employer, there are no damage caps under Section 1981. 151 Nor does a litigant
have to exhaust administrative procedures, including filing an employment
discrimination claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC), under Section 1981 in order to file a court claim. 152 And, for many types
of suits, Section 1981 will have a longer statute of limitation. 153
The current provisions of Section 1981 state in relevant part the following:
(a) Statement of equal rights
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall
have the same right in every State and Territory to make and
enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full
and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of
persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Saint Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 613 (1987).
United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 555 (1875).
Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 168, 174–75 (1976).
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (Title VII) of 1964 § 701, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e (b).
Bachman, supra note 146, at 3.
Id.
Id.
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subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and
exactions of every kind, and to no other.
(b) “Make and enforce contracts” defined
For purposes of this section, the term “make and enforce
contracts” includes the making, performance, modification, and
termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits,
privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual
relationship. 154
The language of Section 1981 would seem to exclude white plaintiffs from
its coverage. However, in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trial Transp. Corp., 155 Justice
Thurgood Marshall, writing for the Court, concluded that the section can protect
white complainants who suffer racial discrimination as well:
Unlikely as it might have appeared in 1866 that white citizens
would encounter substantial racial discrimination of the sort
proscribed under the Act, the statutory structure and legislative
history persuade us that the 39th Congress was intent upon
establishing in the federal law a broader principle than would
have been necessary simply to meet the particular and immediate
plight of the newly freed Negro slaves. And while the statutory
language has been somewhat streamlined in re-enactment and
codification, there is no indication that Section 1981 is intended
to provide any less than the Congress enacted in 1866 regarding
racial discrimination against white persons. Thus, we conclude
that the District Court erred in dismissing petitioners’ claims

154. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)–(b). Note that this is not the precise wording in the original Civil
Rights Act. In response to concerns that it was not authorized by the Thirteenth Amendment,
Congress reenacted the provision after the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification in the Enforcement
Act of 1870, Ch. 114, §§ 16–18, 16 Stat. 140, 144. The 1870 reenactment differed from the original
1866 act in two important respects: it substituted the words “all persons” for “citizens, of every race
and color,” and it omitted the language about equal property rights, which was reenacted separately
in what is now 42 U.S.C. § 1982. See id.; Doe v. Kamehameha Sch., 416 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir.
2005).
155. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trial Transp. Corp., 427 U.S. 273, 295–96 (1976).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3816265

5 BROWN (DO NOT DELETE)

140

N.Y.U. REVIEW OF LAW & SOCIAL CHANGE

9/7/2022 5:02 PM

[Vol. 46:117

under Section 1981 on the ground that the protections of that
provision are unavailable to white persons. 156
B. Americans of the 19th Century Understood Caste Discrimination as Included
Within Race Discrimination
Although Section 1981 does not define race, in Saint Francis College v. Al
Khazraji, the Supreme Court relied on 19th century dictionaries & encyclopedias
in an attempt to understand its meaning. 157 The Court noted that the concept of
race was much broader then than it is today. 158 This section will focus on how, at
that time, Americans understood caste discrimination as a form of race
discrimination. The first subsection will first discuss the Court’s decision in the
Saint Francis College case and its significant inclusion of the Romani as a group
considered to be a racial group in the 19th century. In order to fully comprehend
how Americans viewed caste discrimination as a form of race discrimination in
the 19th century, the second section will discuss the comparison of treatment of
Black people in the U.S. to the caste system in India. The third subsection will
discuss what is known as the “Aryan Origin Theory,” a theory developed by
scholars in the latter half of the 19th century which gained wide acceptance at that
time. The fourth subsection will point to indications by the framers of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 that they viewed the measure as an anti-caste measure. If the
framers of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 believed that outlawing discrimination
against Black people was an anti-caste measure, a fortiori, they would have also
felt their measure should prohibit caste discrimination on American soil practiced
by those from the place in which caste originated.
1. Supreme Court’s Opinion in Saint Francis College v. Al Khazraji
In the Saint Francis College case, the Supreme Court faced the question of
whether an American citizen of Arabian ancestry was protected from racial
discrimination under Section 1981. 159 The District Court concluded that the
plaintiff’s claim was one of national origin and, thus, outside the scope of Section
156. Id. One constant question about § 1981 is: “Does it cover discrimination based on national
origin?” In Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031 (8th Cir. 2011), the plaintiff was a Native
American, but his complaint stated, “Defendant has discriminated . . . against Plaintiff in the
formation of an employment contract on the basis of his national origin, in violation of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981.” Id. at 1053 (emphasis added). The Eighth Circuit noted that § 1981 protects “identifiable
classes of persons who are subjected to intentional discrimination solely because of their ancestry or
ethnic characteristics.” Id. at 1052 (quoting Saint Francis Coll. v. Al–Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 613
(1987)). Thus, the Eighth Circuit agreed that a claim of discrimination based on Native American
status could be raised as a race claim. See Torgerson, at 1053 (citing Dawavendewa v. Salt River
Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 154 F.3d 1117, 1119 (9th Cir. 1198)). However,
Torgerson never amended his complaint to include race discrimination and the Eighth Circuit in an
en banc decision upheld the dismissal. Id.
157. Saint Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604 (1987).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 607.
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1981. 160 The Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff had alleged a discrimination
claim based on race even though under current racial classifications Arabs were
viewed as Caucasians. 161 Congress had not limited Section 1981 claims to those
filed by members of a different race from the defendant. 162
The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that Section 1981 was
not limited to claims of racial discrimination by those of different races. 163 The
Court went on to note that the defendant’s argument rested on the assumption
that all those who might be deemed Caucasians today were
thought to be of the same race when Section 1981 became law in
the 19th century; and it may be that a variety of ethnic groups,
including Arabs, are now considered to be within the Caucasian
race. The understanding of “race” in the 19th century, however,
was different. Plainly, all those who might be deemed Caucasian
today were not thought to be of the same race at the time § 1981
became law. 164
The Court reviewed several 19th-century sources on the definition of race,
and specifically listed several “races” from those sources including Finns,
Romani, Basques, Hebrews, Swedes, Norwegians, Germans, Greeks, Italians,
Spanish, Mongolians, Russians, and Jews. 165 The Court went on to note that “it is
clear that [these 19th-century sources defining race] do not support the claim that
for the purposes of §1981 that Arabs, Englishmen, Germans, and certain other
ethnic groups are to be considered a single race.” 166 To bolster its conclusion, the
Court noted remarks by several Congressmen to the effect that their concept of
race was broad. 167 The Court went on to hold that
[b]ased on the history of § 1981, we have little trouble in
concluding that Congress intended to protect from discrimination
identifiable classes of persons who are subjected to intentional
discrimination solely because of their ancestry or ethnic
characteristics. Such discrimination is racial discrimination that
160. Id. at 606. The plaintiff’s Title VII claim was dismissed because it was not timely filed.
161. Id. at 607. In a 2015 Census Bureau study, researchers found it may be beneficial to
include a dedicated Middle Eastern or North African category in the 2020 census. See Standards for
Maintaining, Collecting, and Presenting Federal Data on Race and Ethnicity, 81 Fed. Reg. 67,398
(Sept. 30, 2016). However, in 2018, officials in the Trump Administration decided not to add the
category. Yousef H. Alshammari, Why Is There No MENA Category on the 2020 US Census?, AL
JAZEERA (Apr. 1, 2020), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/4/1/why-is-there-no-mena
-category-on-the-2020-us-census [https://perma.cc/WF7X-2CA3]. They viewed the category as
about ethnicity, not about race. Id.
162. Saint Francis Coll., 481 U.S. at 607.
163. Id. at 609–10.
164. Id. at 610.
165. Id. at 611.
166. Id. at 612.
167. These remarks will be discussed in detail later in this section. See infra notes 225–33 and
accompanying text.
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Congress intended § 1981 to forbid, whether or not it would be
classified as racial in terms of modern scientific theory. 168
The Court’s inclusion of Romani in its list of racial groups drawn from
contemporary sources is particularly significant. The Romani are believed to be
Dalits who migrated from India into Persia, the near East and, finally, into Eastern
and Central Europe beginning around A.D. 600. 169 Thus, perhaps, the Supreme
Court has already endorsed the notion that Dalits are a separate race under Section
1981.
2. Common Practice of Analogizing Racial Discrimination Against Black
Americans to Caste Discrimination During the 19th Century
In order to fully comprehend the importance of caste discrimination in
discussions during the enactment of Section 1981, it is necessary to understand
the importance of the use of anti-caste legal arguments in American law and
politics during the pre-Civil War period. That discussion will show that by
analogizing race discrimination against Black people to the Indian caste system,
Americans in the 19th century viewed caste as a form of race.
By the early 1830s, antislavery societies in New England had identified the
clear connection between slavery and the denial of civil liberties in the North.170
Even though only a few South Asians immigrated to the U.S. before 1870, 171 to
help demonstrate that both slavery and discrimination against free blacks were
contrary to core principals of American society, some abolitionist proponents of
Black equality, including Frederick Douglass, Thomas Dalton, William Lloyd
Garrison, Harriet Beecher Stowe, and Charles Sumner, compared the treatment of
Black people to the Hindu caste system. 172
168. Saint Francis Coll., 481 U.S. at 613.
169. Palash Ghosh, Centuries of Discrimination: European Roma Linked to India’s
“Untouchables,” INT’L BUS. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2012), https://www.ibtimes.com/centuries
-discrimination-european-roma-linked-indias-untouchables-917965
[https://perma.cc/8N6R
-6DCN]; Niraj Rai, Gyaneshwer Chaubey, Rakesh Tamang, Ajai Kumar Pathak, Vipin Kumar
Singh, Monika Karmin, Manvendra Singh, Deepa Selvi Rani, Sharath Anugula, Brijesh Kumar
Yadav, Ashish Singh, Ramkumar Srinivasagan, Anita Yadav, Manjua Kashyap, Sapna Narvariya,
Alla G. Reddy, George van Driem, Peter A. Underhill, Richard Villems, Toomas Kivisild, Lalji
Singh, & Kumarasamy Thangaraj, The Phylogeography of Y-Chromosome Haplogroup H1a1a-M82
Reveals the Likely Indian Origin of the European Romani Populations, 7 PLOS ONE 1 (2012),
https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0048477 [https://perma.cc/CAL8
-HT5C]; Horolma Pamjav, Andrea Zalán, Judit Béres, Melinda Nagy, & Yuet Meng Chang, Genetic
Structure of the Paternal Lineage of the Roma People, 145 AM. J. PHYSICAL ANTHROPOLOGY 21–29
(2011),
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/ajpa.21454
[https://perma.cc/SQV3
-AY4Q].
170. See, e.g., J. Morgan Kousser, The Supremacy of Equal Rights: The Struggle Against
Racial Discrimination in Antebellum Massachusetts and the Foundations of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 941, 953–55 (1988).
171. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
172. Daniel Immerwahr, Caste or Colony? Indianizing Race in the United States, 4 MOD.
INTELL. 275, 277 (2007).
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The Anti-Slavery Record, an abolitionist series published from 1835 to 1837
by the leading abolitionist organization, the American Anti-Slavery Movement,
contained frequent references to the prevention of caste. For example, one article
discussing the right to end slavery in the District of Columbia argued that
By the most express sanctions of the [C]onstitution, [C]ongress
has the power to abolish [slavery] at the seat of the national
government, and in [C]ongress a majority of forty are from free
states. . . To bring the North up to this work, it is necessary that
the spirit of slavery at the North be met and conquered. The
prejudice of caste must be killed and buried. 173
An 1842 article in Garrison’s The Liberator, another abolitionist publication,
described a meeting of the British India Society where a free Black person spoke
of race relations in the U.S. 174 The writer noted that even though the speaker was
not a slave, the spirit of caste leads the white race to insult all of those of African
descent. 175
Perhaps the most thorough and complete discussion of the caste analogy to
the condition of enslaved people during the antebellum period occurred as part of
the legal arguments in the first major school segregation case in American history.
In Roberts v. Boston, 176 Sarah Roberts sought to attend the nearest school to her
home, which at the time excluded Black students. Sarah was represented by Robert
Morris, one of the first Black attorneys in the U.S., and Charles Sumner, who
would go on to become one of the most influential leaders of the Radical
Republicans in the Senate during the Civil War and Reconstruction. 177 In his
arguments before the Court, Sumner fully developed the analogy of the treatment
of enslaved persons to the caste system in India, an analogy that he constantly
repeated throughout his advocacy of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, as well as the
Fourteenth Amendment. 178
For Sumner, “[t]he separation of children in the Schools, on account of race
or color, is in the nature of caste, and, on this account, a violation of Equality.”179
In his brief, Sumner drew a direct analogy of caste in India to the U.S. “This will
be apparent from the very definition of Caste. This term is borrowed from the
Portuguese word casta, which signifies family, breed, race. It has become
173. The Right of Northern Interference, ANTI-SLAVERY REC. 6 (1837) (emphasis added).
174. American Slavery and the Prejudice Against Color, LIBERATOR 3 (Jan. 7, 1842).
175. Id. For more examples, see Scott Grinsell, “The Prejudice of Caste”: The Misreading of
Justice Harlan and the Ascendency of Anticlassification, 15 MICH. J. RACE & L. 317, 340–42 (2010).
176. Roberts v. Boston, 59 Mass. 198 (1849).
177. Charles Sumner, 1849 Charles Sumner, “Equality Before the Law: Unconstitutionality of
Separate Colored Schools in Massachusetts,” BLACKPAST, https://www.blackpast.org/african
-american-history/1849-charles-sumner-equality-law-unconstitutionality-separate-colored-schools
-massachusetts-2/ [https://perma.cc/WUF8-ZLGV].
178. Id.
179. Brief of Plaintiff, Roberts v. Boston, 59 Mass. 198 (1849), in ABOLITIONISTS IN THE
NORTHERN COURTS: THE PAMPHLET LITERATURE 493, 508 (Paul Finkelman ed. 2007).
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generally used to designate any hereditary distinction, particularly of race. It is in
India that it is most often applied.” 180 Sumner went on:
In India, Brahmins and Sudras, from generation to generation,
were kept apart. If a Sudra presumed to sit upon a Brahmin’s
carpet his punishment was banishment. With similar inhumanity
here, the black child, who goes to sit on the same benches with
the white child, is banished, not from the country, but from the
school. In both cases it is the triumph of Caste. But the offense is
greater with us, because, unlike the Hindoos, we acknowledge
that men are born equal. 181
Sumner concludes, “We abjure all inequality before law; but here is an inequality
which touches not an individual, but a race. We revolt at the relation of caste; but
here is a caste which is established under a Constitution, declaring that all men are
born equal.” 182
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court complimented Sumner on his
advocacy. 183 However, the Court rejected the legal argument of the plaintiffs that
the “maintenance of separate schools tends to deepen and perpetuate the odious
distinction of caste, founded in a deep-rooted prejudice in public opinion.” 184
As Gunnar Mrydal points out in his epic book about American race relations,
the Emancipation Proclamation stopped the common practice of referring to Black
Americans as “slaves.” 185 Instead, the terms “freedmen” and “ex-slaves” came
into popular use. 186 Americans sought a term to describe Black people whom, as
a society, they continued to view as inferior. 187 As a result, the use of the term
“caste” increased significantly. 188
The caste analogy remained central to legal arguments regarding the
treatment of Black people until the end of the century. Perhaps the best example
of the legal importance of the caste analogy is in the arguments advanced by the
plaintiff in the Supreme Court’s 1896 decision in Plessy v. Ferguson. 189 The brief,
filed on behalf of Homer Plessy by James Walker and Albion Tourgee, argued that
slavery was a caste system because it tended “to reduce the colored people of the
country to the condition of a subject race” and imposed upon them the inequality
of rights. 190 Segregation has the same effect. The effect of the law that
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

Id.
Id. at 509.
Id. at 512.
Roberts v. Boston, 59 Mass 198, 206 (1849).
Id. at 209.
GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN
DEMOCRACY 667 (1944).
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
190. Brief for Plaintiff in Error at 23, Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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distinguishes citizens based on race is to legalize caste; as such, it is inconsistent
with the concept of one equal citizenship for all of the United States and each
state. 191 Their caste argument was endorsed by Justice John Marshall Harlan in
his dissent. As virtually every American law student learns in Constitutional Law,
Justice Harlan wrote a separate dissenting opinion in Plessy. 192 In what may very
well be the most renowned passage from any opinion ever written by a justice of
the US Supreme Court, Harlan wrote:
[I]n view of the constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this
country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is
no caste here. Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows
nor tolerates classes among citizens. In respect of civil rights, all
citizens are equal before the law. 193
3. Aryan Origin Theory and Race
The view of caste as a form of race derived in part from the “Aryan Origin
Theory.” Indian historian and Professor Emerita of Jawaharlal Nehru University,
Romila Thapar, called the “Aryan question . . . probably the most complex,
complicated question in the Indian history.” 194 By the late 19th century, the Aryan
Origin Theory had gained wide acceptance in India and become a foundational
lens for interpreting Indian history. 195 The Aryan Origin Theory remains
controversial today and has been refuted by a number of scholars. 196 However,
for the purposes of determining whether caste was understood as a form of race in
19th-century America, the relevant question is not whether the Aryan Origin
Theory is accepted today, but whether Americans then considered differences in
caste to correspond with their broad definition of race.
There were different versions of the theory. One was developed primarily
between 1849 and 1874 by German-born philologist and Orientalist Friedrich Max
Müller. 197 According to Müller, a group of people of shared “Aryan” origin in
Central Asia divided into two groups, one of which migrated to Europe while the
other went to Iran. 198 From Iran, another group travelled into northern India,
where they conquered the indigenous people there and brought the language of
Sanskrit with them. 199 These Aryans fashioned the caste system to maintain their
191. Id.
192. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 552 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
193. Id. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
194. Romila Thapar, The Aryan Question Revisited, ACAD. STAFF C., JAWAHARLAL NEHRU U.
(Oct. 11 1999), http://members.tripod.com/ascjnu/aryan.html [https://perma.cc/9TWW-R6ZY].
195. See Romila Thapar, The Theory of Aryan Race and India: History and Politics, 24 SOC.
SCIENTIST 3, 7 (1996).
196. See T. R. S. Prasanna, There Is No Scientific Basis for the Aryan Invasion Theory, 103
CURRENT SCI. 216, 221 (2012).
197. See Thapar, supra note 195.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 5, 9.
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dominance. As Müller developed the theory, the indigenous people were the
Dravidian race and became the Shudras and Dalits. 200 Thus, high-caste Hindus,
especially the Brahmins, descended from white foreign invaders who migrated
from Central Asia and conquered the northern part of India. Müller referred to
these two different groups using terms that included nation, people, blood, and
race. 201
Another version of the theory was endorsed by Bal Gangadhar Tilak, an
influential Indian Freedom Fighter. 202 His version differed from Müller’s, but due
to Tilak’s influence, his theory should be considered to have the same relevance
to the question of whether Americans of the 19th century would have considered
differences in caste to be differences in race. Rather than Müller’s Central Asian
origins, the theory Tilak endorsed traced the Aryans back to a Nordic homeland
and suggested they had migrated from the Arctic regions in the post-glacial age.203
One group branched off and went into Europe, but lapsed into barbarism, while a
different group migrated into India and maintained their superior civilization.204
Müller disagreed with this version of the theory, but he was supportive enough of
Tilak to help in getting him released from jail when he was incarcerated by the
British government for his nationalist activities.205
For decades, the Aryan Origin Theory was accepted by many upper-caste
members of South Asia who used the theory “to argue the superiority of the upper
castes and promote their self-esteem by maintaining that not only were the uppercastes the lineal descendants of the Aryans but that they were also racially related
to the European Aryan.” 206 The theory also allowed the upper-caste Hindus to
argue not only that they were the creators of the Indian civilization, but as Keshab
Chandra Sen noted, high-caste Indians could assert to their British colonizers that
they were actually “parted cousins.” 207
The Aryan Origin Theory is no stranger to U.S. courts. Not long after the
ratification of the U.S. Constitution, the First Congress passed a restrictive

200. ROMILA THAPAR, THE ARYAN: RECASTING CONSTRUCTS 33–34 (2008).
201. Id. at 34.
202. See Thapar, supra note 195. See also Sukeshi Karma, Bal Gangadhar Tilak in OXFORD
BIBLIOGRAPHIES, https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780195399318/obo
-9780195399318-0214.xml [https://perma.cc/MZ2E-X433]. Bal Gangadhar Tilak (b. 1856–d. 1920)
has been one of the Indian freedom movement’s more contentious leaders.
203. See Thapar, supra note 195, at 4; see also LOKAMANYA BÂL GANGÂDHAR TILAK, THE
ARCTIC HOME IN THE VEDAS: BEING ALSO A NEW KEY TO THE INTERPRETATION OF MANY VEDIC
TEXTS AND LEGENDS vi–vii (1903).
204. Thapar, supra note 195, at 4.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 8. See also Varsha Ayyar & Lalit Khandare, Mapping Color and Caste
Discrimination in Indian Society, in THE MELANIN MILLENNIUM: SKIN COLOR AS 21ST CENTURY
INTERNATIONAL DISCOURSE 71, 79 (Ronald E. Hall ed., 2013).
207. THAPAR, supra note 200, at 7.
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citizenship measure, the Naturalization Act of 1790. 208 This measure limited
naturalized citizenship to “free white persons.”209 From 1909 to 1923, South
Asian plaintiffs brought a series of naturalization cases asserting that they were
Caucasian and, accordingly, eligible for naturalized U.S. citizenship. 210 Courts
initially granted their petitions but were confused about how to handle the racial
status of South Asians. 211
For U.S. legal purposes, though, the Supreme Court delivered the final word
to the Aryan Origin Theory in its unanimous 1923 decision in U.S. v. Bhagat Singh
Thind.212 Thind argued that, as a high-caste Hindu of full Indian blood, born at
Amritsar, Punjab, India, he was an Aryan descendant and was therefore Caucasian
and entitled to naturalized citizenship. 213 The Supreme Court rejected Thind’s
argument. 214 In doing so, the Court noted that to determine the meaning of the
words “white persons,” its meaning must be taken from what the original framers
of the 1790 statute thought the words meant in common ordinary speech and not
scientific origin. 215 Thus, the Court held, “[i]t may be true that the blond
Scandinavian and the brown Hindu have a common ancestor in the dim reaches of
antiquity, but the average man knows perfectly well that there are unmistakable
and profound differences between them to-day.” 216 The Court went on to reject
the notion that Indian people at the time had preserved their racial integrity, but
had instead clearly intermarried with the local people. 217 The Court concluded its
opinion by stating, “It is a matter of familiar observation and knowledge that the
physical group characteristics of the Hindus render them readily distinguishable
from the various groups of persons in this country commonly recognized as
white.” 218

208. See IAN F. HANEY-LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 42–46
(1996) (citing Naturalization Act, Ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103 (1790)). After the Civil War, Congress amended
this Act to expand coverage to those of African nativity or African descent. Id.
209. Id.
210. For a discussion of these cases, see Taunya L. Banks, Both Edges of the Margin: Blacks
and Asians in Mississippi Masala, Barriers to Coalition Building, 5 ASIAN L. REV. 7, 19–20 (1998).
211. Id.
212. United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind, 261 U.S. 204 (1923).
213. Id. at 210. Interestingly, Dr. Bhagat Singh Thind was actually a Sikh. Doug Coulson,
British Imperialism, the Indian Independence Movement, and the Racial Eligibility Provisions of the
Naturalization Act: United States v. Thind Revisited, 7 GEO. J. L. MOD. CRIT. RACE PERSP. 1, 3 n.6
(2015).
214. Thind, 261 U.S. at 213.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 209.
217. Id. at 212–13.
218. Id. at 215.
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4. Congressional Debates During the Passage of the Civil Rights Act of
1866
In discussing the legislative history of Section 1981, it is important to note
that the Congress that adopted the Civil Rights Act of 1866 had to respond to
claims that the Act exceeded legislative authority under the Thirteenth
Amendment. 219 Scholars agree that one of the purposes of enacting the Fourteenth
Amendment, adopted by the same Congress two months after overriding President
Johnson’s veto of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, was to constitutionalize the
provisions of the Act. 220 After the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, Congress
re-enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1866 in the Enforcement Act of 1870, also
known as the Voting Rights Act of 1870. 221 Thus, when thinking about the
legislative history of Section 1981, not only is the Civil Rights Act of 1866
relevant, but so are the Congressional discussions regarding the enactment of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
The ratification process of the Thirteenth Amendment banning slavery
concluded on December 6, 1865. This was about the time that Congress was
beginning its session. Section 2 of that Amendment provided, “Congress shall
have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.” 222
Slavery was more than physical bondage. The U.S. legal system did not
consider enslaved people to have legal personhood. 223 Thus, they did not have
legal rights that would allow them to enter into contracts, own or lease property,
be a witness in legal proceedings, sue or be sued in Court, or perform other legal
functions. 224 The Supreme Court infamously affirmed this lack of legal status in
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 225 decided four years before the start of the Civil War,
which held that no Black person, enslaved or free, could be a citizen of the United
States. 226
219. See infra notes 234–39 and accompanying text.
220. RAOUL BERGER, SELECTED WRITINGS ON THE CONSTITUTION 185 (1987) (“[T]he
uncontroverted evidence, confirmed in these pages, is that the framers [of the Fourteenth
Amendment] repeatedly stated that the amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 were ‘identical’
. . . .”); see also ANDREW KULL, THE COLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTION 75 (1992) (“It was the
demonstrable consensus of the Thirty-ninth Congress that section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment
‘constitutionalized’ the Civil Rights Act of 1866.”); MICHAEL J. PERRY, WE THE PEOPLE: THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE SUPREME COURT 72 (1999) (“Recall that whatever else it did,
the second sentence of section one constitutionalized the 1866 Civil Rights Act.”); RALPH A.
ROSSUM & G. ALAN TARR, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND SUBSEQUENT
AMENDMENTS 53 (8th ed. 2010) (“The Fourteenth Amendment was obviously designed to
constitutionalize the Civil Rights Act of 1866.”).
221. Enforcement Act of 1870, Ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1981–82 (2000)).
222. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2.
223. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 450 (1857) (holding that Scott, an enslaved Black
man, was property).
224. Id. at 427 (holding that Scott, as a noncitizen, could not bring a suit in federal court).
225. Id.
226. Id.
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As evidenced by the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, most members
of Congress believed that Section Two of the Thirteenth Amendment gave it the
authority to legislate to eliminate not just physical bondage, but the badges and
incidents of slavery as well. After Congress came back into session, Republicans
began to work on measures that would protect the basic civil rights of all citizens,
especially those who were Black. 227 Needless to say, Congress had never passed
a measure to protect the rights of Black Americans in its history. Thus, the Act
proved to be Congress’ first anti-discrimination measure.
During one Senate debate, in response to the argument that the government
was organized in the interest of the white race, Senator Justin Morrill argued that
the Declaration of Independence’s language precluded the idea of a country being
based on any such distinction between races, colors, or castes. 228 Five days later,
Sumner spoke during the Senate debate on the topic of the perpetual dominance
of the white race. 229 He noted that this idea creates “nothing less than a Caste,
which is at once irreligious and unrepublican. A Caste cannot exist except in
defiance of the first principles of Christianity and the first principles of a
Republic.” 230 Sumner went on to note that Brahmins and Sudras had been
separated generationally in India in the same way black and white people were
separated in the U.S. 231 Agreeing with Sumner that a “caste exclusion is entirely
contrary to the spirit of our Government,” Senator William Fessenden nonetheless
expressed the view that he felt such a measure eliminating all distinctions of color
between people would not pass. 232 In March, Representative John Martin
Broomall argued,
[T]he government of the United States above all other duties owes
it to itself and to humanity to guard the rights of those who in the
midst of rebellion periled their lives and fortunes for its honor, of
whatever caste or lineage they may be . . . and . . . no system of
reconstruction ought to be considered unless it shall effectually
guaranty [sic] the rights of Union men of the South. 233
Framers of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 had to contend with detractors who
claimed it was an unconstitutional intrusion on state sovereignty that went beyond
the scope of the authority granted by the Thirteenth Amendment. Indeed, one of
the criticisms that President Johnson leveled against the Act in his veto message

227.
(2014).
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863–1877, at 243
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 570–71 (1866).
Id. at 683.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 704.
Id. at 1262.
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was that it exceeded Congress’s powers under the Thirteenth Amendment. 234 John
Bingham, a principal drafter of Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment, also
believed that prior to the passage of the Amendment, Congress lacked power for
the 1866 Act. 235 As the opponents put it, the power of Congress to legislate against
slavery did not contain the power to provide equal civil rights or prohibit private
acts of discrimination. 236 Passing the Fourteenth Amendment allowed the Act’s
proponents to defend against the possibility that the courts might agree with
Johnson’s conclusion and the risk that, even if the Act survived judicial scrutiny,
a subsequent Congress could decide to repeal it. 237 Thus, Congress sought to
ensure the validity and permanency of the rights granted in the Act by enacting
the Fourteenth Amendment. 238 Congress passed the Fourteenth Amendment and
sent it to the states for ratification on June 13, 1866, just two months after
overriding Johnson’s veto of the 1866 Act. 239
Some Constitutional scholars have argued that the Fourteenth Amendment
was intended to ban all systems of caste or class legislation.240 Americans
understood class and caste as nearly interchangeable terms 241 during these times,
which were before the publication of Das Kapital that popularized the use of
“class” conflicts in the writings of Karl Marx. 242 For example, in the debate on
the Fourteenth Amendment on May 23, 1866, Senator Jacob Howard stated that
234. President Andrew Johnson, March 27, 1866: Veto Message on Civil Rights Legislation
(1866), https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/march-27-1866-veto-message
-civil-rights-legislation [https://perma.cc/XC7U-R4W6] (last visited Sept. 10, 2021) (writing that
“the bill undoubtedly comprehends cases and authorizes the exercise of powers that are not, by the
Constitution, within the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States”).
235. MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND
THE BILL OF RIGHTS 80 (Duke Univ. Press, 1986). Bingham was one of a small group of Republicans
who subscribed to this argument. Id.
236. See EDWARD MCPHERSON, THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
DURING THE PERIOD OF RECONSTRUCTION 75 (Washington, James J. Chapman, 3d ed. 1880).
237. See George Rutherglen, The Improbable History of Section 1981: CLIO Still Bemused
and Confused, 9 SUP. CT. REV. 303, 312 (2003).
238. See supra note 220 and accompanying text. See also Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 847,
852 (1948) (“Indeed, as the legislative debates reveal, one of the primary purposes of many members
of Congress in supporting the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment was to incorporate the
guaranties of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 in the organic law of the land.”).
239. FONER, supra note 227, at 247, 254.
240. Steven Calabresi & Julia T. Ricker, Originalism and Sex Discrimination, 90 TEX. L. REV.
1, 4. Professor Melissa L. Saunders has argued that the Amendment goes beyond just banning
systems of caste based on hereditary and social stigmatization. Melissa L. Saunders, Equal
Protection, Class Legislation, and Colorblindness, 96 MICH. L. REV. 245, 247–48 (1997). See also
John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 1385, 1413
(1992) (arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment was specifically geared toward ending the injustice
inherent in caste systems).
241. Calabresi & Ricker, supra note 240, at 17, 19. See also Slaughter-House Cases 83 U.S.
36, 410 (1872) (discussing the Equal Protection Clause) (“We doubt very much whether any action
of a State not directed by way of discrimination against the negroes as a class, or on account of their
race, will ever be held to come within the purview of this provision.”) (emphasis added).
242. Das Kapital was published in 1867. 1 KARL MARX, DAS KAPITAL, DER
PRODUKTIONSPROCESS DES KAPITALS (Hamburg, Meissner, 1867).
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the Fourteenth Amendment would “abolish[] all class legislation in the States and
do[] away with the injustice of subjecting one caste of persons to a code not
applicable to another.” 243 He acknowledged the caste-like system that existed
between Black and white people in the U.S. and went on to note the different ways
this amendment would end the legally sanctioned system as it existed then.244 In
explaining the meaning of Section One, Representative Thomas Eliot said:
I support the first section because the doctrine it declares is right,
and if, under the Constitution as it now stands, Congress has not
the power to prohibit State legislation discriminating against
classes of citizens or depriving any persons of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, or denying to any persons
within the State the equal protection of the laws, then, in my
judgment, such power should be distinctly conferred. 245
After Congress passed the Fourteenth Amendment, the Republican National
Party published a bulletin championing it as an anti-caste measure. Published in
August of 1866, the bulletin read, “The Republicans in Congress tried to the extent
of their powers to abolish throughout the bounds of the republic the evils of caste,
as second only to those of slavery.” 246
The Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in July of 1868, followed 18 months
later by the Fifteenth Amendment, which prohibited any state or the United States
from denying or abridging the right of citizens to vote on account of race, color,
or previous condition of servitude. 247 Two months before the ratification of the
Fifteenth Amendment, Sumner published an essay entitled The Question of Caste,
which was the substance of remarks he made at speeches he delivered in a dozen
cities in the Northeast. 248 In his essay, Sumner once again fully discussed the caste
analogy, making several of the same points that he first made in his arguments in
Roberts v. Boston. 249 After the ratification by the states of the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments, the Republican-controlled Congress reenacted the Civil

243. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (1866).
244. Id.
245. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2511 (1866).
246. Calabresi & Ricker, supra note 240, at 35 (quoting Who Did It?, PHILA. N. AM. & U.S.
GAZETTE, Aug. 18, 1866, at 1).
247. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; U.S. CONST. amend. XV. The Fifteenth Amendment was
ratified on February 3, 1870.
248. HON. CHARLES SUMNER, QUESTION OF CASTE 3, 9 (1869), https://ia800901.us.archive.org
/29/items/questionofcaste00sumn/questionofcaste00sumn_bw.pdf [https://perma.cc/7NQK-EZV3].
249. Sumner connects the caste system to the feudal system in Europe where the son was to
engage in the same occupation as his father. He describes the four major Hindu castes, which he
notes have their origins in the Laws of Manu and are called “varnas” in Sanskrit, which translates to
“colors.” Sumner says the Brahmins proceed from the mouth of the Creator, the Kshatriya from the
arm, the Vaishya from the thigh, and the Shudra from the foot. Summer points out that below the
Shudra is the Pariah (Dalit). See id.
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Rights Act of 1866 in 1870. 250 Congress would also split parts of Section One of
the Act into Sections 1981 and 1982. However, both Sections used nearly identical
language, and the Supreme Court has construed them similarly. 251 The former
section dealt primarily with most of the rights covered under the original act, while
the latter section dealt with property rights. 252
The purpose of discussing the history of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the
Fourteenth Amendment is not to resolve the jurisprudential dispute regarding the
proper interpretation of these measures. Rather, it is to demonstrate that as
Congress considered enacting Section 1981, it also had in mind that the measure
could combat the maintenance of a caste system on American soil. Thus, the caste
system on the Indian subcontinent was in the background of the anti-caste thinking
in pursuit of eliminating discrimination suffered by Black people in the U.S.
5. Conclusion
The Supreme Court has interpreted the meaning of race within the context of
Section 1981 based upon its understanding in the 19th century. 253 Since, in the
19th century, caste differences were viewed as race differences, it could very well
be that courts will view caste discrimination based on untouchability as a form of
racial discrimination under Section 1981.
IV.
IS CASTE DISCRIMINATION COVERED BY ONE OF THE PROTECTED TRAITS OF
TITLE VII?
Title VII applies to employers with 15 or more employees, and it operates
during hiring, termination, promotion, compensation, job training, or any other
term, condition, or privilege of employment. 254 As the Supreme Court has
interpreted the law, “[w]hat is required by Congress is the removal of artificial,
arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers operate
invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible
classifications.” 255
Employers may be held liable under Title VII based on several theories
including disparate treatment, which is likely to be the most applicable to an
250. Enforcement Act of 1870, Ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1981–82 (2000)). Congress revised and codified the United States Code in 1874.
251. Id.; CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 447 (2008) (noting that the Court’s
precedents have long “construe[d] §§ 1981 and 1982 similarly”).
252. Congress also enacted its first codification of federal law in 1874. Runyon v. McCrary,
427 U.S. 160, 168 n.8 (1975) (“The commissioners who prepared the 1874 draft revision were . . .
given authority to ‘revise, simplify, arrange, and consolidate all statutes of the United States.”).
253. Saint Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 610 (1987). See supra note 147 and
accompanying text.
254. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (Westlaw through P.L. 116-259).
255. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973) (citing Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429 (1971)).
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individual Dalit employee. Disparate treatment discrimination includes
harassment claims and occurs when an employer is motivated to treat one
employee differently because of a protected trait. Title VII also provides for
retaliation claims that apply when the employer discriminates against an employee
for engaging in protected activities. Thus, if caste discrimination based on
untouchability is covered by Title VII, employees who suffer adverse employment
actions because they complain, either internally or externally, would have
retaliation claims to pursue distinct from their underlying employment
discrimination claim. Protection from retaliation is also critical for Dalits and
could encourage more of them to come forward and reveal the discrimination they
suffer on the job.
Dalits are vulnerable to discrimination by employers on several bases: their
Asian ethnicity, their color, the religion they practice, their sex, or their country of
origin. However, if the discrimination is based on these characteristics, their caste
is irrelevant to their claim. Thus, instead of focusing on any of those claims, this
part will address the question of whether caste discrimination based on
untouchability fits within any of the protected traits.
It is clear that caste discrimination does not fit into the protected trait of sex.
Many South Asians feel that there is a correlation between color and caste. 256 In
addition, the Sanskrit term of “varna” translates to color. But this refers to spiritual
color as opposed to physical color. 257 Like people of all races and ethnicities,
Dalits come in a large array of skin colors. The experiences of Asian, Black, and
Latinx individuals in the U.S. demonstrate that discrimination based on color is
separate from discrimination based on race or national origin. For caste
discrimination based on untouchability, the source is not color, it is caste. 258
There is the possibility that a Dalit claimant could assert a “religious nonadherence discrimination claim,” also referred to as a “reverse religious
discrimination claim,” that would fit within the protected trait of religion. The first
section will address whether caste discrimination fits as a form of religious
discrimination. The second section will discuss whether caste discrimination fits
within the concept of race discrimination. In doing so, the second section will
present four different legal analyses. The third subsection will address whether
courts could recognize caste discrimination based on untouchability as a form of
national origin discrimination. In doing so it discusses four different legal
arguments that caste discrimination fits within national origin discrimination.
256. For a discussion of colorism among South Asians, see Taunya Lovell Banks, Colorism
Among South Asians: Title VII and Skin Tone Discrimination, 14 WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. L. REV.
665 (2014); Varsha Ayyar & Lalit Khandare, Mapping Color and Caste Discrimination in Indian
Society, in THE MELANIN MILLENNIUM: SKIN COLOR AS 21ST CENTURY INTERNATIONAL DISCOURSE
71–95 (Ronald E. Hall ed. 2013).
257. Ayyar & Khandare, supra note 256, at 74; See also MOHANTY, supra note 109, at 151.
258. See Smita Narula, supra note 9, at 259 (“To begin, the visual cues that accompanied
apartheid in South Africa, or racial discrimination in other parts of the world, are lacking in India.
Caste is like oxygen—it is both invisible and indispensable.”).
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A. Is Caste Discrimination Based on Untouchability a Form of Religious
Discrimination?
Title VII provides a definition of religion that includes “all aspects of
religious observance and practice, as well as belief.” 259 The EEOC “define[s]
religious practices to include moral or ethical beliefs about what is right and wrong
which are sincerely held with the strength of traditional religious views.”260
Employers are required to accommodate their employees’ religious beliefs, unless
the employer demonstrates that they are unable to reasonably do so without undue
hardship on the conduct of their business. 261 The problem with arguing that caste
fits within this definition of religious discrimination is that being a Dalit is
determined at birth. 262 Thus, the discrimination that Dalits face is not the result of
what they believe or the practices of their beliefs. On the contrary, the
discrimination tends to stem from the discriminators’ own religious beliefs which
include negative views about Dalits. Discriminating against someone due to their
caste does not appear to fit neatly within this aspect of discriminating against a
Dalit because of the Dalit’s religion. 263
Several courts, however, have recognized the validity of religious nonadherence discrimination claims. 264 In a religious non-adherence claim, an
employee argues that their employer discriminated against them because the
employee did not share the employer’s religious beliefs. 265 Thus, the employee’s
specific religious beliefs do not matter as much as the employer’s religious beliefs
in motivating the taking of adverse employment action beyond the simple fact that
they diverge. 266 In the case of Noyes v. Kelley Services, Inc., the plaintiff’s
supervisor and recently promoted co-worker belonged to a small religious sect
known as the Fellowship that had around 2000 members. 267 A third of the
Fellowship members lived together in a compound in Apollo, California. 268 The
259. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j).
260. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1.
261. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.
262. See supra notes 128–130 and accompanying text.
263. As was discussed earlier (see supra notes 135–37, and accompanying text), many Dalits
have become Ambedkarite Buddhists. While there may be a plausible argument that religion is a
motivating factor, generally speaking, it is not that they practice Buddhism, but that they are Dalits
that motivates the discriminator. A discriminator against an Ambedkarite Buddhist is not likely to
manifest the same discriminating motives regarding a Buddhist who was born into a high caste or a
Japanese Buddhist, for example. See Waughray, supra note 49, at 214 (2009).
264. Alex Reed, Religious Nonadherence Claims as a Means of Contesting LGB-Related
Employment Bias, 40 BERKLEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 340 (2020). See, e.g., Shapolia v. Los Alamos
Nat’l Lab’y, 992 F.2d 1033, 1038 (10th Cir. 1993); Venters v. City of Delphi, 123 F.3d 956 (7th Cir.
1997); Noyes v. Kelly Servs., 488 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2007); Magden v. Easterday Farms, No. 2:16CV-00068-JLQ, 2017 WL 1731705, at *6–7 (E.D. Wash. May 3, 2017).
265. Harold M. Brody & Catherine Brito, Reversing Claims of Reverse Religious
Discrimination, 34 EMP. REL. TODAY 77, 77 (2007).
266. Venters, 123 F.3d at 972.
267. Noyes, 488 F.3d at 1166.
268. Id.
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sect members abided by strict rules that governed their way of life.269 The plaintiff
believed her supervisor passed her over for a promotion in order to give it to a coFellowship member and perceived a general pattern at work of Fellowship
members receiving favorable treatment.270 The Ninth Circuit found that the
plaintiff established triable issues of fact. 271 Interpreting an earlier decision by the
Tenth Circuit in Shapolia v. Los Alamos National Laboratories, 272 the Ninth
Circuit in Noyes stated,
The court reasoned that the “protected class” showing required in
a traditional race or sex discrimination claim does not apply to
this type of non-adherence or reverse religious discrimination
claim because “it is the religious beliefs of the employer, and the
fact that [the employee] does not share them, that constitute the
basis of the [religious discrimination] claim.” 273
The Seventh Circuit also addressed a religious non-adherence claim decision
in Venters v. City of Delphi. 274 The plaintiff, Jennifer Venters, was appointed the
head dispatcher for the City of Delphi police department by an outgoing Chief of
Police. 275 The new Chief of Police, Larry Ives, made it clear from the beginning
that “he was a born-again Christian who believed that his decisions as police chief
should be guided by the principles of his faith, and that he had been sent by God
to Delphi to save as many people from damnation as possible.” 276 Venters did
not share the Chief’s religious beliefs, but took a while to tell him so because she
was afraid. 277 After suffering through a number of efforts by the Chief to “save
her soul” over the next three years, Venters was fired by Ives, who claimed that
Venters had demonstrated poor work performance. 278 Venters believed she was
terminated for failing to “measure up to [Ives’] religious expectations.” 279 In
concluding that Venters had successfully raised a Title VII claim, the Court noted
that Venters “need only show that her perceived religious shortcomings (her
unwillingness to strive for salvation as Ives understood it, for example) played a
motivating role in her discharge.” 280 In response to Ives’s claim that he had
provided non-discriminatory reasons for the decision to fire Venters, the Court
269. Id.
270. Id. at 1171.
271. Id. at 1172.
272. Shapolia v. Los Alamos Nat’l Lab’y, 992 F.2d 1033, 1038 (10th Cir. 1993).
273. Noyes, 488 F.3d at 1168–69 (citing Shapolia, 992 F.2d at 1038).
274. Venters v. City of Delphi, 123 F.3d 956 (7th Cir. 1997).
275. Id. at 962.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 963.
278. Id. at 963–64.
279. Id. at 970.
280. Id. at 972; see also Blalock v. Metals Trades, Inc., 775 F.2d 703, 708–09 (6th Cir. 1985)
(explaining that employer’s willingness to give special consideration to those who shared his
religious views and his withholding of same consideration from those who did not constitutes direct
evidence that religion played role in plaintiff’s discharge).
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held that, when there is direct evidence of discrimination, the “pertinent question
is whether the city’s evidence as to the legitimate reasons for terminating Venters
eliminates any doubt as to whether religion played at least a motivation role in her
discharge.” 281
The focus of religious non-adherence claims is the discriminator’s beliefs.
Thus, a Dalit victim of caste discrimination based on untouchability may be able
to establish a question of triable fact. Effectively, what the Dalit victim would
assert is that, by not following the discriminator’s religious beliefs that Dalits
should act and behave in certain ways, they are refusing to share the perpetrator’s
religious beliefs.
B. Is Caste Discrimination Based on Untouchability Covered Under the
Protected Trait of Race?
Is caste discrimination race discrimination? This is a perplexing question that
has received significant attention in the international legal context. 282 Title VII
does not define the term “race” and the EEOC has not done so either.283 Courts,
too, are uncertain about its definition for the purposes of Title VII claims. 284 The
claims based on race and national origin “may substantially overlap or even be
indistinguishable depending on the specific facts of a case.” 285
There seem to be four available legal analyses to consider in determining if
the definition of “race” includes caste. One is to look to the definitions of the
various racial groups adopted by the federal government to determine if caste fits
in the definition of a racial category. The second starts with the recognition that
the federal courts have generally treated race discrimination under Section 1981
the same as under Title VII, meaning they have applied a definition of race as
understood in the 19th century. 286 The third route is based on the legislative
history of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The fourth is looking at contemporary
sources of the 1960s to see how race was defined.

281. Venters, 123 F.3d at 972.
282. See supra notes 49–51 and accompanying text.
283. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Sols., 852 F.3d 1018, 1026 (11th
Cir. 2016). See also 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e (West 2021).
284. Salas v. Wis. Dep’t of Corrs., 493 F.3d 913, 923 (7th Cir. 2007) (“In the federal courts,
there is uncertainty about what constitutes race versus national origin discrimination under Title
VII.”)
285. Deravin v. Kerik, 335 F.3d 195, 201 (2d Cir. 2003). See also Garcia v. Hatch City Pub.
Schs., 458 P.3d 378, 385 (N.M. 2018) (“[T]he takeaway from these cases is that terms like race and
national origin, as well as related terms like ancestry and ethnicity, often overlap, even to the point
of being factually indistinguishable.”)
286. See, e.g., Walker v. Sec. of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Serv., 713 F. Supp. 403, 405
(N.D. Ga. 1989); Village of Freeport v. Barrella, 814 F.3d 594, 607 (2d Cir. 2016). See also supra
notes 145–47 and accompanying text.
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1. Determining Whether Caste Discrimination is Race Discrimination
Using the Federal Government’s Definitions of Race
Each year, certain employers subject to Title VII are required to submit an
EEO-1 Report to the Joint Reporting Committee, which consists of the EEOC and
Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs. 287 Data requested on the EEO1 Report tracks employees by race, ethnicity, sex, and job classification. 288 The
EEO-1 Reports provide useful data on the race and ethnicity of employees, using
the definitions mandated by the federal government, which first became required
for employers in 1980. 289
Even though the federal government has collected racial data for over 200
years as part of the census process, no federal standards for the collection of data
on race and ethnicity applied across all federal agencies until the 1970s.290 Federal
agencies were increasingly collecting racial and ethnic data at the time because of
civil rights laws enacted in the 1960s. 291 In 1976, Congress passed Public Law
94-311, which required federal agencies to provide a separate count of the Latinx
population. 292
On May 12, 1977, the Race and Ethnic Standards for Federal Statistics and
Administrative Reporting (“Directive 15”) became effective for all federal
government agencies, including the EEOC. 293 The federal government undertook
a review of Directive 15 from 1993 to 1997. 294 The 1997 Revisions also provided
that other federal programs adopt its standards. 295 The 1997 Revisions were first
287. See U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, EEO-1 Data Collection,
https://www.eeoc.gov/employers/eeo-1-data-collection [https://perma.cc/6PFK-KET5] (last visited
Mar. 27, 2022). Employers who must file include those with at least one hundred employees and
federal government contractors with at least fifty employees and meeting certain criteria. Id.
288. See U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, EEO-1 Component 1 Fact Sheet: Report
Types, https://www.eeocdata.org/pdfs/EEO-1_Fact_Sheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q468-3S6N] (last
visited Mar. 27, 2022).
289. For a discussion of the history of the creation of the federal government’s definitions for
race and ethnicity, see KEVIN BROWN, BECAUSE OF OUR SUCCESS: THE CHANGING RACIAL AND
ETHNIC ANCESTRY OF BLACKS ON AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 43–60 (2014).
290. See Katherine K. Wallman, Suzann Evinger, & Susan Schechter, Measuring Our Nation’s
Diversity: Developing a Common Language for Data on Race/Ethnicity, 90 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH
1704, 1704 (2000).
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, DIRECTIVE NO. 15, RACE AND ETHNIC STANDARDS FOR
FEDERAL STATISTICS AND ADMINISTRATIVE REPORTING (as adopted on May 12, 1977). In 1978, the
standards were renamed “Statistical Policy Directive No. 15, Race and Ethnic Standards for Federal
Statistics and Administrative Reporting,” or Directive 15. For a more complete retelling of the
change of the name of Directive No. 15, see RAINER SPENCER, SPURIOUS ISSUES: RACE AND
MULTIRACIAL IDENTITY POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES 70–71 (1999).
294. For a list of the steps taken, see Revisions to the Standards for the Classification of Federal
Data on Race and Ethnicity, 62 Fed. Reg. No. 210 58,782–83 (Oct. 30, 1997),
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-1997-10-30/pdf/97-28653.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SE5B
-4SGD].
295. Id. at 58,789.
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utilized for the 2000 census and were incorporated into the EEOC’s regulations in
time for the 2007 EEO-1 Reports. 296
The 1997 Revisions, as well as the EEOC regulations, which are still currently
in use, classified Hispanic or Latinx status as an ethnicity, not a race. 297 The term
Hispanic or Latinx “refers to persons who trace their origin or descent to Mexico,
Puerto Rico, Cuba, Central or South American or some other Spanish culture.” 298
The definitions for the five racial categories contained in the 1997 Revisions are
as follows:
a. American Indian or Alaska Native—A person having origins
in any of the original peoples of North and South America
(including Central America), and who maintains tribal affiliation
or community attachment.
b. Asian—A person having origins in any of the original peoples
of the Far East, Southeast Asia, or the Indian subcontinent
including, for example, Cambodia, China, India, Japan, Korea,
Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippine Islands, Thailand, and
Vietnam.
c. Black or African American—A person having origins in any of
the black racial groups of Africa.
d. Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander—A person having
origins in any of the original peoples of Hawaii, Guam, Samoa,
or other Pacific Islands.
e. White—A person having origins in any of the original peoples
of Europe, the Middle East, or North Africa. 299
While South Asians have started to spread throughout the world, adherents of
the caste system originally hail from Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal,

296. For a discussion of this process, see BROWN, supra note 289, at 43–60.
297. Revisions to the Standards for the Classification of Federal Data on Race and Ethnicity,
62 Fed. Reg. No. 210 58,789 (Oct. 30, 1997), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-1997-10
-30/pdf/97-28653.pdf [https://perma.cc/V9GA-VVJB]. For the EEO-1 reports, the ethnicity issue is
limited to whether a person is Hispanic or not. Thus, they are of no help in determining a person’s
ethnic origin for purposes of a Title VII claim.
298. Agency Information Collection Activities, Notice of Submission for OMB Review; Final
Comment Request to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 70 Fed. Reg. 71,295, 71,301
(Nov. 28, 2005). The definition of Asian from Directive 15 was “Asian or Pacific Islander—A person
having origins in any of the original peoples of the Far East, Southeast Asia, the Indian subcontinent,
or the Pacific Islands. This area includes, for example, China, India, Japan, Korea, the Philippine
Islands, and Samoa.” The 1997 Revisions removed Pacific Islanders from this category and
combined them with Native Hawaiians into a new racial category of “Native Hawaiian or Other
Pacific Islander.” Id. at 58,786; OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, DIRECTIVE NO. 15, RACE AND ETHNIC
STANDARDS FOR FEDERAL STATISTICS AND ADMINISTRATIVE REPORTING (as adopted on May 12,
1977). For a discussion of the EEOC guidelines, see BROWN, supra note 296.
299. Id.
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Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Tibet, and other countries in Asia. 300 Although the racial
categories listed in the 1997 Revisions would consider all of those with a caste to
be Asian, since caste alone would not be considered a race, caste discrimination
would not equate to race discrimination.
2. Defining Race for Purposes of Title VII as it Was Defined by Section
1981
Although employers must use the above racial categories when reporting their
employees to the EEOC, this definition of race should not necessarily be used to
determine what is “race discrimination” under Title VII. Section 1981 is the
historical predecessor of Title VII with regard to recognizing claims of race
discrimination in employment.301 Courts have also treated race discrimination
under Section 1981 the same as under Title VII. 302
The Second Circuit’s decision in Village of Freeport v Barrella, 303 which
recently addressed the issue of whether Hispanics are a race or a national origin
group under Title VII, is particularly instructive. 304 The Second Circuit noted that
the District Court had struggled to determine whether the term “Hispanic” fell
within the legal definition of race, partly due to the federal government’s “lessthan-straightforward use of those terms.” 305 The Court noted that, considering
merely those federal definitions discussed above, Hispanic/Latinx is considered
an ethnicity, not a race. 306
From the standpoint of Title VII, the issue of whether Hispanic status is
considered a race has long been controversial.307 But, in Section 1981 claims,
courts have a history of finding that it fits within the definition of race
discrimination. 308 Many courts assumed that people who were Hispanic formed a
300. See, e.g., OMVEDT, supra note 46, at 31 (“Caste system exists in South Asian subcontinent
and there only.”)
301. See, e.g., Walker v. Fulton Cnty. Sch. Dist., 713 F. Supp. 403, 405 (N.D. Ga. 1989).
302. See, e.g., id. (“[T]he legal elements and facts necessary to support a claim for relief under
Title VII are identical to the facts which support a claim under § 1981.”); Village of Freeport v.
Barrella, 814 F.3d 594 (2d Cir. 2016) (“[W]e analyze claims of racial discrimination identically
under Title VII and § 1981 in other respects, and we see no reason why we should not do the same
with respect to how we define race for purposes of those statutes.”).
303. Barrella, 814 F.3d 594
304. The case may be particularly instructive given the Court’s characterization of the correct
definition of “Hispanic” as a “vexed question.” Id. at 602. This may provide a helpful parallel to the
difficulty in characterizing “caste” within anti-discrimination laws.
305. Id.
306. Id. See also supra note 297 and accompanying text.
307. Barrella, 814 F.3d at 606.
308. Id. at 607. See also Albert v. Carovano, 851 F.2d 561, 572 (2d Cir. 1988) (en banc); Rivera
v. United States, 928 F.2d 592, 607 (2d Cir. 1991) (noting that § 1981 “protect[s] against
discrimination on the basis not only of race, but also of ‘ancestry or ethnic characteristics’” (quoting
Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 128 (1981))); Lopez v. S.B. Thomas, Inc., 831 F.2d 1184, 1188
(2d Cir.1987) (“There can be no question that [§ 1981’s ban on racial discrimination] includes
persons . . . who are of Puerto Rican descent.”).
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protected class under Title VII without clarifying whether it was race or national
origin, while others have found the underlying intent to be irrelevant.309
Repeatedly, though, courts have “assumed that claims of ethnicity-based
discrimination, including discrimination based on Hispanicity, are cognizable as
claims of racial discrimination under Title VII, albeit without holding so
explicitly.” 310
Before the Village of Freeport case, the Second Circuit had determined that
Hispanic or Latino status was a national origin group under Title VII. 311 In
Freeport, though, the Second Circuit considered that if it excluded Hispanic status
from Title VII’s definition of race, plaintiffs pursuing both Section 1981 and Title
VII claims might in some circumstances need to present two different factual
arguments in order to invoke the distinct remedies of these two statutes that apply
to employment discrimination.312 The Second Circuit concluded “race” in Title
VII claims encompassed ethnicity to avoid this result. 313
Courts’ pattern of equating the definitions of race under Section 1981 and
Title VII suggests that the discussion earlier in the Article of Section 1981’s
applicability to caste discrimination based on untouchability as race
discrimination will also apply to the application of Title VII. 314 However, the
Supreme Court has concluded that the definition of “race” for purposes of Section
1981 is to be drawn from its understanding in the 19th century. One could argue
that this definition is not appropriate for Title VII, which was enacted almost 100
years later. But the Second Circuits decision points to how a considered decision
to do so would create a huge legal problem.
3. Congressional Debates During Passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
During deliberations that led to the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
several members of Congress discussed their desire not to recognize a caste system

309. Barrella, 814 F.3d at 606.
310. Id. at 607 (“In Malave v. Potter, for instance, we implicitly acknowledged the viability of
a Title VII race-discrimination claim based on Hispanic ethnicity.”) (citing 320 F.3d 321, 324 (2d
Cir. 2003)).
311. See Goenaga v. March of Dimes Birth Defects Found., 51 F.3d 14, 19 (2d Cir.1995)
(describing requirements for showing “an inference of ethnic discrimination” under Title VII).
312. 814 F.3d at 606.
313. Id.
314. See supra note 301 and accompanying text.
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in the U.S. 315 The most significant discussion of the South Asian caste system
during the debates of the Act came from Paul Douglas, a Democratic senator from
Illinois, when he addressed the issue of school segregation. He argued that
[t]he caste system still endures in India and is a great disgrace
upon India; but at least the Government of India has had the
courage and the foresight to make it illegal; at least it is not
sanctified by law; and, at least in theory and law, the temples are
open to members of all castes-both the high castes and the low
castes. 316
The references to caste were not as numerous during the Congressional
debates that led to the passage of Civil Rights Act of 1964 as they were during the
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Nevertheless, these Congressional
references to caste suggest that Congress continued with the view that caste
differences were equivalent to race differences into the 1960s.
4. Contemporary Sources Defining Race
Looking to contemporary sources of encyclopedias and dictionary definitions
of race may not, alone, be helpful in determining whether caste discrimination fits
within these definitions. The edition of Black’s Law Dictionary published in 1951
did not include a definition of race. 317 The 1964 Concise Oxford Dictionary
defined race as the following:
Group of Persons . . . connected by common descent posterity of
(person); house, family, tribe or nation regarded as of common
stock; distinct ethnical stock (the Caucasian, Mongolian, etc.) . . .;
Descent, kindred, (of noble, oriental, etc.)
Class of persons with some common feature . . . . 318
The 1964 Webster’s New World Dictionary defined race as follows:

315. During the House debates, a Republican Representative from Minnesota argued that “this
country did not develop a caste system whereby we would have first- and second-class citizens.”
110 CONG. REC. 1582, 1646 (1964). On February 10, 1964, Representative William St. Onge (DConnecticut) noted, “We must not recognize any caste system in the United States, or the supremacy
of one race over another. Such practices can never be justified in the light of our moral and
democratic principles, because there is no moral justification for racial or religious discrimination.”
110 CONG. REC. 2705, 2783 (1964). In discussing Title VI during the Senate debate on April 7, 1964,
Senator John Pastore of Rhode Island acknowledged that segregation was “a caste system that
imposed an inferior status on the Negro citizen from cradle to grave.” 110 CONG. REC. 7051, 7055
(1964).
316. 110 CONG. REC. 6812, 6823 (1964). There were a few other mentions of caste during the
debates of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. For example, Representative Abernathy, who opposed the
Act because, in his words, the bill ignored the discrimination by African Americans against each
other, referred to caste. See 110 CONG. REC. 2548, 2555 (1964).
317. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1951).
318. Race, THE CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1964).
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Any of the major biological divisions of mankind, distinguished
by color and texture of hair, color of skin and eyes, stature, bodily
proportions, etc.: many ethnologists now consider that there are
only three primary divisions, the Caucasian (loosely, white race),
Negroid (loosely, black race), and Mongoloid (loosely, yellow
race), each with various subdivisions: the term has acquired so
many unscientific connotations that in this sense it is often
replaced in scientific usage by ethnic stock or group. . .
A population that differs from others in the relative frequency of
some gene or genes: a modern scientific usage
Any geographical, national, or tribal ethnic grouping
a) the state of belonging to a certain ethnic stock, group, etc. b)
the qualities, traits, etc. belonging, or supposedly belonging, to
such a division
Any group of people having the same ancestry; family; clan;
lineage
Any group of people having the same activities, habits, ideas, etc.:
as, the race of dramatists. 319
These definitions may not lead to conclusive results. Arguably, some of the
above definitions would include Dalits as a race. For example, the definition of
“any group of people having the same ancestry; family; clan; linage.” Others
would not include Dalits as a race. 320
C. Is Caste Discrimination Based on Untouchability Covered Under the
Protected Trait of National Origin Discrimination?
Title VII 321 does not define national origin. In Espinoza v. Farah
Manufacturing Company, 322 the Supreme Court discussed whether failing to hire
a permanent resident because they were not a U.S. citizen constituted national
origin discrimination. The Court understood the term “national origin” to “refer[]
to the country where a person was born, or, more broadly, the country from which
his or her ancestors came.” 323 The Court went on to note that, while “an earlier
version of § 703 had referred to discrimination because of ‘race, color, religion,
national origin, or ancestry,’” the removal of the word ancestry was not supposed
to be a material change, but was rather considered to be synonymous with

319. Race, WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE: COLLEGE
EDITION (1964).
320. See, e.g., supra note 319, noting that many ethnologists now consider that there are only
three primary divisions.
321. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. et seq.
322. Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co. Inc., 414 U.S. 86 (1973).
323. Id. at 88.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3816265

5 BROWN (DO NOT DELETE)

9/7/2022 5:02 PM

2022] CASTE DISCRIMINATION IN U.S. FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT LAW

163

“national origin.” 324 Further, in considering a situation in which an employer
required prospective employees to have an Anglo-Saxon background, the Court
affirmed that such a condition would be clearly illegal. 325
Following the same reasoning, the Ninth Circuit has held that a Serbian
complainant could bring a national origin employment discrimination claim even
though, at the time, Serbia no longer existed as a nation. 326 The EEOC’s guidance
on discrimination based on national origin also defines it as the “denial of equal
employment opportunity because of an individual’s, or his or her ancestor’s, place
of origin; or because an individual has the physical, cultural or linguistic
characteristics of a national origin group.” 327
While physical and linguistic characteristics may not differentiate Dalits from
other South Asians, the membership of a group presumed by discriminators to be
religiously polluted could constitute a cultural group. 328 One Third Circuit
opinion addressing a national origin claim provides language that may be
particularly applicable to the type of caste discrimination that Dalits encounter:
Discrimination stems from a reliance on immaterial outward
appearances that stereotype an individual with imagined, usually
undesirable, characteristics thought to be common to members of
the group that shares these superficial traits. It results in a
stubborn refusal to judge a person on his merits as a human being.
Our various statutes against discrimination express the policy that
this refusal to judge people who belong to various, particularly
disadvantaged, groups is too costly to be tolerated in a society
committed to equal individual liberty and opportunity. 329
Given the above discussions about the definition of national origin, the Dalits
could assert at least four different legal theories that they constitute a national
origin group.

324. Id. at 89.
325. Id. at 95. See also Kanaji v. Children’s Hosp. of Phila., 276 F. Supp. 2d 399, 401–02 (E.D.
Pa. 2003) (finding it “clear that the Supreme Court would not require that one’s national origin be
linked directly to a specific country or nation” but rather embraces “a broader class of people” and
refers to “certain traits or characteristics that can be linked to one’s place of origin”).
326. Pejic v. Hughes Helicopters, Inc., 840 F.2d 667, 673 (9th Cir. 1988). See also Roach v.
Dressler Industrial Valve & Instrument Division, 494 F. Supp. 215, 218 (W.D. La. 1980)
(recognizing discrimination against Cajun employees as national origin discrimination under Title
VII even though the colony of Acadia no longer existed). National origin also encompasses
discrimination based on foreign accents. See Fragante v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 888 F.2d 591,
595 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1081 (1990) (addressing appellant’s argument that
“national origin” under Title VII also encompasses discrimination based on foreign accents).
327. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.1 (emphasis added).
328. See supra notes 108–15 and accompanying text.
329. Bennun v. Rutgers State Univ., 941 F.2d 154, 173 (3d Cir. 1991).
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1. Dalits as a National Origin Group Due to Stigmatization by Caste
Members
The cultural experience of Dalits that is the basis of a caste discrimination
claim based on untouchability is the idea that Dalits possess some sort of religious
pollution. 330 Like the Third Circuit acknowledged, this prevents Dalits from being
judged based on their individual merit; they are instead stereotyped with imagined
undesirable characteristics. Their history in South Asia was one of being set apart
from Caste Hindus and non-Dalit members of other religions and compelled to
practice endogamy. Remedying this historical injustice is consistent with Title
VII’s stated purpose of removing “artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to
employment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of
racial or other impermissible classification.” 331
2. Dalits as a National Origin Group Based on Ancestry Analogy to U.K.
Treatment of Caste Discrimination
The Supreme Court has noted that the deletion of the term “ancestry” from an
earlier list of protected traits by Congress was not a material change because
“national origin” was considered synonymous. 332 A Dalit complainant could
argue that discrimination against them is the product of common descent as a form
of ancestry, an argument that has had success in the United Kingdom.
The Equality Act, passed in the U.K. in 2010, prohibits discrimination on nine
grounds, including race, defined by statute as including color, nationality, and
ethnic or national origins. 333 “Ethnic origins” has been interpreted as a “wide and
flexible” 334 phrase which also includes questions of birth, lineage, descent, and
ancestry. 335 In Tirkey v. Chandhok, the U.K.’s first and to date only successful
caste discrimination case, the claimant was a domestic servant trafficked from
India to work in a private home in the U.K. 336 She alleged egregious violations of
employment rights and unlawful discrimination contrary to the Equality Act.337
Since she had no access to an explicit statutory prohibition of caste discrimination,
she alleged her discrimination had occurred for reasons related to her ethnic
origins including her status in the caste system as perceived by the respondents.338
The Employment Tribunal found that she was mistreated by the respondents
330. See supra notes 122–30 and accompanying text.
331. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800–01 (1973) (quoting Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430–31 (1971)).
332. See supra note 324 and accompanying text.
333. See Nat’l Archives, Equality Act 2010, Part II, Chapter I, LEGISLATION.GOV.UK,
https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/15/part/2/chapter/1 [https://perma.cc/4JTV-ZJ83].
334. Chandhok & Anor v. Tirkey, Appeal No. UKEAT/0190/14/KN, ¶ 44 (Emp. Appeal Trib.
Dec. 19, 2014).
335. R (E) v Governing Body of JFS [2009] UKSC 15, [28].
336. Tirkey v. Chandhok [2015] EAT 3400174/2015, [205]–[210].
337. Id. at ¶ 1.
338. Id. at ¶ 205–10.
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because of race, specifically because of her ethnic origins—defined as her birth,
her descent, her inherited position in society or caste, and her background and
upbringing. 339 The concept of descent or ancestry in the U.K. is thus far broader
than the concept of the land of one’s ancestors. Descent was relied on by the
tribunals in the Tirkey litigation as the legal source of a prohibition of caste
discrimination, albeit with the proviso that this finding was case-specific and not
intended to establish a general proposition. 340
Dalit complainants in the U.S., too, could make the argument that
discrimination based on untouchability is derived from their ancestry in the sense
that it is derived from the descent or inherited position due to their caste. Given a
broad definition of national origin, it is possible that this form of discrimination
would fit within that category.
3. Aryan Origin Theory and National Origin Discrimination
A third argument derives from the Aryan Origin Theory discussed earlier.341
As protests increased for Indian independence from Great Britain, many South
Asian scholars increasingly criticized the Aryan Origin Theory, noting that it was
the product of a biased view of Western thinkers.342 A new explanation asserted
that the Aryans were actually the initial inhabitants of India. According to this
theory, original Hindus were the Aryans, a distinctive people indigenous to India.
Caste Hindus or Hindu Aryans are their descendants. Thus, there was no Aryan
invasion, since the Aryans were indigenous to India, and, therefore, no
confrontation between them and the original people of India occurred. 343
Despite the criticisms of the Aryan Origin Theory, however, recent research
may be bringing it back into societal good graces. A 2018 DNA study provides

339. Id. The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (ICERD) defines racial discrimination as discrimination on grounds of race, color,
descent, or national or ethnic origin. The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
(CERD)—ICERD’s monitoring body—has affirmed that the term descent in ICERD includes the
concept of caste; see Annapurna Waughray and David Keane, CERD and caste-based
discrimination, in FIFTY YEARS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL
FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION: A LIVING INSTRUMENT (Waughray & Keane eds., 2017).
340. Chandhok & Anor v. Tirkey, Appeal No. UKEAT/0190/14/KN, ¶ 55 (Emp. Appeal Trib.
Dec. 19, 2014).
341. See supra notes 195–218 and accompanying text.
342. For a more recent criticism by a professor at the Indian Institute of Technology Bombay,
see Prasanna, supra note 196 (discussing the evidence that scientists must consider in order to
form an opinion on the Aryan Invasion Theory).
343. Id.
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genetic evidence for the Aryan Origin Theory. 344 The study documents “a
southward spread of genetic ancestry from the Eurasian Steppe, correlating with
the archaeologically known expansion of pastoralist sites from the Steppe to Turan
in the Middle Bronze Age (2300–1500 BCE).” 345 It genetically links ancestry
from the Steppe to Europe and South Asia in the Bronze Age and identifies the
populations that almost certainly were responsible for spreading Indo-European
languages across much of Eurasia. 346 Another genetic study concluded that:
[T]he upper castes have a higher affinity to Europeans than to
Asians, and the upper castes are significantly more similar to
Europeans than are the lower castes. Collectively, all five datasets
show a trend toward upper castes being more similar to
Europeans, whereas lower castes are more similar to Asians. 347
If the Aryan Origin Theory continues to regain widespread acceptance,
discrimination based on untouchability could be recognized as a form of national
origin discrimination under Title VII. If Dalits are descendants of the indigenous
people, and the high-caste Hindus are descendants of the Aryans, then they have
different national origins.

344. VAGHEESH M. NARASIMHAN, NICK PATTERSON, PRIYA MOORJANI, IOSIF LAZARIDIS, MARK
LIPSON, SWAPAN MALLICK, NADIN ROHLAND, REBECCA BERNARDOS, ALEXANDER M. KIM, NATHAN
NAKATSUKA, IÑIGO OLALDE, ALFREDO COPPA, JAMES MALLORY, VYACHESLAV MOISEYEV, JANET
MONGE, LUCA M. OLIVIERI, NICOLE ADAMSKI, NASREEN BROOMANDKHOSHBACHT, FRANCESCA
CANDILIO, OLIVIA CHERONET, BRENDAN J. CULLETON, MATTHEW FERRY, DANIEL FERNANDES,
BEATRIZ GAMARRA, DANIEL GAUDIO, MATEJA HAJDINJAK, ÉADAOIN HARNEY, THOMAS K. HARPER,
DENISE KEATING, ANN MARIE LAWSON, MEGAN MICHEL, MARIO NOVAK, JONAS OPPENHEIMER,
NIRAJ RAI, KENDRA SIRAK, VIVIANE SLON, KRISTIN STEWARDSON, ZHAO ZHANG, GAZIZ AKHATOV,
ANATOLY N. BAGASHEV, BAURYZHAN BAITANAYEV, GIAN LUCA BONORA, TATIANA CHIKISHEVA,
ANATOLY DEREVIANKO, ENSHIN DMITRY, KATERINA DOUKA, NADEZHDA DUBOVA, ANDREY
EPIMAKHOV, SUZANNE FREILICH, DORIAN FULLER, ALEXANDER GORYACHEV, ANDREY GROMOV,
BRYAN HANKS, MARGARET JUDD, ERLAN KAZIZOV, ALEKSANDER KHOKHLOV, EGOR KITOV, ELENA
KUPRIYANOVA, PAVEL KUZNETSOV, DONATA LUISELLI, FARHOD MAKSUDOV, CHRISTOPHER
MEIKLEJOHN, DEBORAH MERRETT, ROBERTO MICHELI, OLEG MOCHALOV, ZAHIR MUHAMMED,
SAMARIDDIN MUSTAFOKULOV, AYUSHI NAYAK, RYKUN M. PETROVNA, DAVIDE PETTENER, RICHARD
POTTS, DMITRY RAZHEV, STEFANIA SARNO, KULYAN SIKHYMBAEVA, SERGEY M. SLEPCHENKO,
NADEZHDA STEPANOVA, SVETLANA SVYATKO, SERGEY VASILYEV, MASSIMO VIDALE, DMITRIY
VOYAKIN, ANTONINA YERMOLAYEVA, ALISA ZUBOVA, VASANT S. SHINDE, CARLES LALUEZA-FOX,
MATTHIAS MEYER, DAVID ANTHONY, NICOLE BOIVIN, KUMARASAMY THANGARAJ, DOUGLAS J.
KENNETT, MICHAEL FRACHETTI, RON PINHASI, & DAVID REICH, THE GENOMIC FORMATION OF SOUTH
AND CENTRAL ASIA, BIORXIV (2018), https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/292581v1
[https://perma.cc/BV4H-WAZ6].
345. Id. at 4.
346. Id. According to the authors, “this work sheds new light on the spread of Indo-European
languages and parallels between the genetic history of two sub-continents, Europe and South Asia.”
Id.
347. Michael Bamshad, Toomas Kivisild, W. Scott Watkins, Mary E. Dixon, Chris E. Ricker,
Baskara B. Rao, J. Mastan Naidu, B.V. Ravi Prasad, P. Govinda Reddy, Arani Rasanayagam,
Surinder S. Papiha, Richard Villems, Alan J. Redd, Michael F. Hammer, Son V. Nguyen, Marion L.
Carroll, Mark A. Batzer, & Lynn B. Jorde, Genetic Evidence on the Origins of Indian Caste
Populations, 11 GENOME RES. 994, 994 (2001).
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Whether this would be a strong argument for Dalits, however, can be doubted.
In Roach v. Dressler Industrial Valve & Instrument Division, a Louisiana District
Court addressed a Title VII national origin discrimination claim brought by a
Cajun plaintiff, who was a native-born American of Acadian descent. 348 Although
Acadia was never a country but instead a French colony founded in the early 1600s
that the British conquered in 1713, the Court recognized that a national origin
claim was available to the plaintiff. 349 Following the rationale of the Roach court,
it would be irrelevant that the Indus Valley Civilization was not a country. What
matters is that Dalits comprised a group of people sharing a common culture,
ancestry, land, and other social characteristics. However, this argument is fraught
with more difficulty and less certainty than the recognition of a national origin
claim for an Acadian. A court would have to accept a theory of the origin of the
caste system that has been contested for decades. 350 In order to find that the
plaintiff had stated a claim, a court would need to define national origin based on
events that occurred thousands of years ago as opposed to hundreds of years ago.
Courts may simply find this ancestry too remote to support the claim that Dalits’
ancestors and their descendants constitute a separate national origin group.
4. Dalits as a National Origin Group Based on Applying Section 1981’s
Definition
As noted in the discussion of courts using the definition of Section 1981 to
apply to race discrimination under Title VII, the same argument can be made about
national origin discrimination. The definition of race discrimination in Section
1981 has also been interpreted by courts to be broad enough to also cover national
origin discrimination. Thus, the recognition of caste discrimination as a form of
race discrimination under Section 1981 could also lead to a conclusion that it is
national origin discrimination under Title VII.
V.
CHANGE THE PROTECTED TRAIT APPROACH ARTICULATED IN BOSTOCK
There are evidently several strong arguments that caste discrimination based
on untouchability is included in race discrimination under Section 1981 and within
a number of protected traits under Title VII. The arguments about whether caste
discrimination is a form of race or national origin discrimination depend upon how
those terms are interpreted. However, if the arguments already discussed above do
not succeed, then the legal analysis adopted by the Supreme Court in its opinion
in Bostock v. Clayton County may be of assistance. 351 The approach the Court
348. Roach v. Dressler Indus. Valve & Instrument Div., 494 F. Supp. 215, 218 (W.D. La.
1980).
349. Id. at 217.
350. Prasanna, supra note 196, at 216 (noting that the Aryan Invasion Theory “has always been
controversial”).
351. Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
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takes in Bostock would avoid the question of whether caste fits in a race or national
origin category. Instead, it would recognize that caste is intertwined with being a
member of the Asian race and, as such, caste discrimination involves the protected
category of race. This part will discuss the application of the Bostock approach to
the issue of whether caste discrimination is recognized under Title VII or Section
1981. The first section will discuss the Court’s decision in Bostock v. Clayton
County. The second section will apply the Bostock approach to caste
discrimination based on untouchability under Title VII. The third section will
apply it to Section 1981.
A. Bostock v. Clayton County
In June 2020, the Supreme Court delivered its 6 to 3 opinion in Bostock v.
Clayton County. 352 Justice Gorsuch, writing for the Court, answered the question
of whether termination of an employee for the sole reason of their homosexuality
or transgender status violates Title VII’s prohibition against sex discrimination.353
The Court noted that the test to determine whether such discrimination involves
sex discrimination is to change the person’s sex and see if it would yield a different
choice by the employer. 354 If so, then the discrimination is also sex
discrimination. 355
Bostock involved three different employment discrimination claims brought
by long-time employees. 356 Two of the plaintiffs, Gerald Bostock and Donald
Zarda, were terminated by their employers soon after they revealed they were
homosexuals. The third, Aimee Stephens, who had lived as a man for the first six
years of employment, was fired when she revealed that she would start to live as
a woman. 357 These three individuals brought employment discrimination claims
against their former employers contending that they were victims of sex
discrimination under Title VII. 358
The Court noted that, over the years, Title VII has been applied to aspects of
discrimination that may not have been in the Congressional drafters’ imaginations
when they enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 359Justice Samuel Alito’s dissent,
joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, goes to great lengths to point this out. 360 Not
only does Alito point out that Congress did not intend to provide such protection,
352. Id. Justices Roberts, Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor and Kagan joined the opinion written
by Justice Gorsuch. Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Thomas and Kavanaugh. Id.
353. Id. at 1737.
354. Id. at 1741.
355. Id.
356. Id. at 1737–38.
357. Id.
358. Id.
359. Id. For example, Title VII now bans discrimination based on motherhood and sexual
harassment of male employees regardless of the lack of Congressional intent behind the application
of the law. Id.
360. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1754 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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but also that “ordinary Americans reading the text of Title VII in 1964 would not
have dreamed that discrimination because of sex meant discrimination because of
sexual orientation, much less gender identity.” 361 Alito goes on to note that
“[w]hile Americans in 1964 would have been shocked to learn that Congress had
enacted a law prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination, they would have been
bewildered to hear that this law also forbids discrimination on the basis of
‘transgender status’ or ‘gender identity.’” 362 He points out that the term “gender
identity” did not appear in academic circles until 1964, doctors in the U.S. did not
perform the first sex change operations until 1966, and the term “transgender” was
not coined until the early 1970s. 363
Justice Gorsuch, in the majority opinion, notes that Congress enacted other
statutes since the 1964 Civil Rights Act that did address sexual orientation.364
Over the years, it also considered amending Title VII to include protection for
sexual orientation, but never did. 365 Gorsuch does not find the failure of Congress
to include explicit sanctions for discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation
or gender identity relevant:
[A]pplying protective laws to groups that were politically
unpopular at the time of the law’s passage—whether prisoners in
the 1990s or homosexual and transgender employees in the
1960s—often may be seen as unexpected. But to refuse
enforcement just because of that, because the parties before us
happened to be unpopular at the time of the law’s passage, would
not only require us to abandon our role as interpreters of statutes;
it would tilt the scales of justice in favor of the strong or popular
and neglect the promise that all persons are entitled to the benefit
of the law’s terms. 366
Gorsuch also makes the relevant point that, in a disparate treatment case, the
employer’s discriminatory actions are determined by focusing on their negative
impact on the individual victim and not the group of which the victim is a
member. 367 In other words, in a disparate treatment case, the issue is not whether
the employer treats women differently than men, but whether the employer
discriminates against any individual because of that individual’s sex. 368 Thus, if
the employer would fire a gay man the same as a lesbian woman, it might be said
361. Id. at 1767 (Alito, J., dissenting).
362. Id. at 1772. (Alito, J., dissenting).
363. Id. at 1772–73. (Alito, J., dissenting).
364. Id. at 1747.
365. H.R. 5, 116th Cong., 1st Sess. (2019). Some attempts have failed. As recently as 2019,
for example, the House of Representatives passed a bill which would have defined sex discrimination
to include both sexual orientation and gender identity; however, the measure stalled in the Senate.
Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1750.
366. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1751.
367. Id. at 1740.
368. Id. at 1740-41.
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that the employer is treating men and women alike. However, the relevant question
relates to the employer discriminating against the individual employee based on
sex, not on whether the employer discriminates against men or women. 369
Much of Gorsuch’s opinion for the Court addresses the issue of what it means
for an employer to discriminate against a person “because of” a person’s sex.370
In answering the question of the meaning of “because of,” the Court applies the
“simple and traditional” standard of but-for causation typically used in tort cases
and set forth in University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, a
Title VII retaliation case. 371 But-for causation exists whenever a particular
outcome would not have happened without the purported cause. 372
The ordinary meaning of the language of Title VII leads to the following
conclusion: “If the employer intentionally relies in part on an individual
employee’s sex when deciding to discharge the employee—put differently, if
changing the employee’s sex would have yielded a different choice by the
employer—a statutory violation has occurred.” 373 Even if an employer’s goal is
only to discriminate against a person because they are gay, lesbian, or transgender,
that is not possible without also discriminating against the person because of their
sex. 374 While being gay or lesbian is distinct from a person’s sex, an individual’s
homosexuality or transgender status is tied inextricably to their sex. 375 Thus, when
an employer fires a gay, lesbian, or transgender person, there are two causal factors
involved: both the person’s sex and something else (attraction to others of the same
sex or identifying with a different gender than the one received at birth). 376
To illustrate what he means, Gorsuch works through a couple of examples.
First, he discusses an employer who has two employees that are attracted to men,
but one is a woman and the other is a man. 377 If the employer would fire the man
because he is attracted to another man, but not the woman attracted to a man, then
the employer’s decision to fire the male employee reveals that the employer is
firing the male employee for actions that the employer tolerates in a female

369. Id. at 1740–41, 1748.
370. Id. at 1740. Gorsuch notes that Congress could have used other causation tests such as
“solely” or “primarily because of,” which would have indicated the prohibited factor was the main
cause of the defendant’s employment decision. Id. at 1739. He also noted that Congress amended
Title VII in 1991 to allow a plaintiff to prevail merely by showing that a protected trait was a
“motivating factor” in an adverse employment action. Id. Thus, “under this more forgiving standard,
liability can sometimes follow even if sex wasn’t a but-for cause of the employer’s challenged
decision.” Id. However, the motivating factor test is not the issue in Bostock.
371. Univ. of Tex. SW Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 339 (2013).
372. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1739. Gorsuch notes that “a but-for test directs us to change one
thing at a time and see if the outcome changes. If it does, we have found a but-for cause.” Id. The
Court also notes that multiple but-for causes can exist.
373. Id.
374. Id. at 1745–46.
375. Id.
376. Id. at 1741–42.
377. Id. at 1741.
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employee. 378 The same logic applies to transgender individuals. Take an employer
who would fire a person that was assigned male at birth because the person decides
now to identify as a female. If that employer would retain an otherwise identical
employee who was assigned female at birth, then the employer is penalizing the
person who was assigned male at birth for actions that he tolerates with regard to
an employee who was assigned female at birth. 379
The Court addresses the counterargument that, if you change the sex of a
homosexual or a transgender individual, but not their sexual orientation or gender
identification, then you eliminate the characteristic of the individual—being gay,
lesbian or transgender—that motivated the employer to take the discriminatory
action. 380 Gorsuch notes that this argument might work if Title VII only ensured
equal treatment of men and women or if the statute applied only when sex was the
sole or primary reason for the employer’s actions, but it goes beyond that—even
if sex was not the main factor, it was a but-for factor. 381
B. Application of the Bostock Approach to Caste Discrimination Under Title VII
While Gorsuch applied the change the protected trait approach in Bostock to
sex discrimination, 382 there is no reason to think that such a test would not also
apply to the other protected traits mentioned in Title VII where the discrimination
victim’s protected trait is inextricably linked to another immutable characteristic
from birth they possess. Like sexual orientation and gender identity, a person’s
caste is also an immutable characteristic originating with birth that others may use
to identify a person. 383 Thus, in discussing whether Title VII applies to caste
discrimination based on untouchability, Justice Gorsuch’s opening salvo in
Bostock appears an appropriate introduction:
Those who adopted the Civil Rights Act [of 1964] might not have
anticipated their work would lead to this particular result. Likely,
they weren’t thinking about many of the Act’s consequences that
have become apparent over the years, including its prohibition
against discrimination on the basis of motherhood or its ban on
the sexual harassment of male employees. But the limits of the
drafters’ imagination supply no reason to ignore the law’s
demands. When the express terms of a statute give us one answer
and extratextual considerations suggest another, it’s no contest.
Only the written word is the law, and all persons are entitled to its
benefit. 384
378.
379.
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1747–48.
Id. at 1748.
See supra notes 373–79 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 117–19 and accompanying text.
Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1737.
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Applying the Bostock approach to discrimination against Dalits, the
motivation for the adverse employment decision will not be eliminated by
changing the sex or color of the employee. Whether a Dalit is male or female, dark
complexion or light complexion, they are still a Dalit.
1. Does the Bostock Approach Using Religion Work for Dalits?
With respect to religion, as discussed in the third part, 385 there is the
possibility that a victim of intentional caste discrimination based on untouchability
who suffered an adverse employment action could succeed on a reverse religious
discrimination claim. However, under the Bostock approach, a Dalit is not likely
to succeed by asserting discrimination based on religion because changing the
religion of a Dalit is unlikely to change the discrimination. As noted earlier, caste
is a product of Hinduism; however, it has permeated the other religions in South
Asia, including Buddhism, Christianity, Islam, and Sikhism. 386 Thus, while the
Hindu religion may be the original source of caste oppression, conversion to other
religions is not a solution. 387 Given that South Asians bring their religious beliefs
with them when they immigrate to the U.S., it is unlikely that changing the religion
of a Dalit would lead the employer to a different choice regarding the adverse
employment action.
2. Does the Bostock Approach Using National Origin Work for Dalits?
Earlier, this article discussed a number of different arguments that a Dalit
victim of caste discrimination could assert for the conclusion that caste based on
untouchability could be considered national origin under Title VII. 388 If Dalits are
considered a national origin group using any of these approaches, however, then
the Bostock approach is unnecessary. If Dalits are not a national origin group, then
there is no national origin to change. Thus, the Bostock approach would not be
applicable to national origin.
3. Does the Bostock Approach Using Race Work for Dalits?
The Bostock approach may be most effective for a claim within the protected
trait of race. Using the federal definitions of race, which were first adopted in
1977, then, as already noted, all of those who have a caste would fit under the
definition of who is Asian. 389 As with plaintiffs who have been discriminated
against on the basis of their gender identity or sexual orientation, which are
inextricably entwined with their sex, Dalits’ status is inextricably entwined with
their race. Applying the Bostock approach means that if we change the race of a
385.
386.
387.
388.
389.

See supra notes 259–81 and accompanying text.
See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
Babu & Prasad, supra note 130.
See supra notes 322–50 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 287–350 and accompanying text.
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particular Dalit victimized by caste discrimination based on untouchability from
Asian to, say, Black or white, then the person would no longer be a Dalit. For
employers whose adverse employment actions are motivated by a desire to engage
in caste discrimination based on untouchability, changing individuals’ race would
lead to different decisions because such individuals would no longer be Dalits.
B.

Application of the Bostock Approach to Caste Discrimination Under
Section 1981

If a court rejects the argument that caste discrimination is a form of race
discrimination under Section 1981, 390 Dalits can also assert the Bostock approach
in a Section 1981 claim. Even though Section 1981 does not contain the “because
of” language found in Title VII, 391 in order to establish causation, the Supreme
Court recently reiterated that a successful Section 1981 plaintiff must demonstrate
that “but for race,” the defendant would not have taken the discriminatory action
the defendant took. 392
Because we are dealing with the same “but for” test for race discrimination
under Section 1981 as discussed in Bostock for Title VII, 393 it would follow that
the change in the protected trait approach that Gorsuch specifically mentions
would also apply for Section 1981 claims. As a result, for a disparate treatment
claim under Section 1981, like Title VII, the question to ask, once again, would
be, if we changed the race of an aggrieved Dalit who is a victim of caste
discrimination from Asian to white, would the employer have made a different
choice? Like when we discussed the application of the Bostock approach to Title
VII, 394 the answer is yes, because there are no white Dalits. Thus, caste
390. See supra notes 144–253 and accompanying text.
391. See supra note 31 and accompanying text
392. Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Afr. Am.-Owned Media, 140 S. Ct. 1009 (2020). Justice
Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court in this case as well. The Court restated its embrace of
the “but-for” test for the application of § 1981 to race discrimination, holding that
[t]he guarantee that each person is entitled to the “same right . . . as is enjoyed
by white citizens” directs our attention to the counterfactual—what would have
happened if the plaintiff had been white? This focus fits naturally with the
ordinary rule that a plaintiff must prove but-for causation. If the defendant would
have responded the same way to the plaintiff even if he had been white, an
ordinary speaker of English would say that the plaintiff received the ‘same’
legally protected right as a white person. Conversely, if the defendant would
have responded differently but for the plaintiff’s race, it follows that the plaintiff
has not received the same right as a white person.
Id. at 1015. See also The Supreme Court 2019 Term, 134 HARV. L.R. 580, 588 (2020) (arguing that
the “but-for” test applied to § 1981 in Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Afr. Am.-Owned Media
adopted a narrow causation standard in contravention of the purpose of § 1981, while going on to
note in footnote 78 that “one might argue that in light of Bostock v. Clayton County, in which the
Court recognized the possibility of multiple but-for causes, it is not precisely true that the Court is
requiring something meaningfully more difficult to satisfy in requiring that a plaintiff show a butfor cause”).
393. See supra notes 389–392 and accompanying text.
394. See supra notes 389–90 and accompanying text.
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discrimination based on untouchability would also be actionable as race
discrimination under Section 1981.
VI.

CONCLUSION
In this Article, we have discussed the question of whether a victim of caste
discrimination based on untouchability can argue that it is a form of employment
discrimination under the federal employment discrimination law under Title VII
or Section 1981. This Article contends that there are legitimate arguments that
caste discrimination based on untouchability is a form of religious discrimination
under Title VII. The question of whether caste discrimination is a form of race or
national origin discrimination under Title VII or Section 1981 is complex. The
argument comes down to whether this form of discrimination fits within the
definitions of those protected traits under the respective statutory frameworks.
There are legitimate arguments that caste discrimination based on untouchability
is a form of national origin or race discrimination recognized by federal
employment discrimination law. However, if courts reject the notion that caste
discrimination based on untouchability is a form of national origin and/or racial
discrimination, the Bostock approach would provide another potent legal argument
for recognizing such discrimination. The Bostock approach avoids the question of
whether caste discrimination based on untouchability is a form of national origin
or racial discrimination and instead recognizes that the “but-for” causation
standard applies under both Section 1981 and Title VII. But-for causation exists
whenever a particular outcome would not have happened without the purported
cause. Thus, the but-for test directs us to change one thing at a time and see if the
outcome changes. If it does, we have found a but-for cause; further, multiple butfor causes can exist. Under this approach, because all of those who are victims of
caste discrimination based on untouchability are from Asia, their caste is
inextricably intertwined with their race. Thus, when Dalits are victims of
intentional discrimination based on untouchability, the discriminator is motivated
to discriminate against them because of their caste, which is not a protected trait,
and their race, which is. Thus, caste discrimination inevitably also involves race
discrimination.
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